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REGULATION OF CHARITABLE SOLICITATION:
A REVIEW AND PROPOSAL
Athornia Steele*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has decided three major cases involving
charitable solicitation legislation.' In each case the Court struck down as
unconstitutional legislation which directly and substantially regulated solic-
itation activity. From the perspective of governmental authorities these
cases severely affect their ability to regulate certain aspects of charitable
solicitation. Charitable organizations and professional fund raisers, how-
ever, breathed a sigh of relief At the state2 and federal3 court level at least
four cases have been decided with similar impact. Although both the
Supreme Court and state decisions allegedly apply and reaffirm established
principles used to test the validity of solicitation regulations and are decided
against a backdrop of a number of earlier Supreme Court cases, at least two
questions arise. One question is whether these recently decided cases actu-
ally extend earlier established principles and case decisions, thus belittling
the regulatory approach adopted by the governmental authorities. A second
question is whether alternative legislation can be drafted which will allow
authorities to directly regulate those aspects of charitable solicitation found
to be invalid in these recent cases.
Both of the above questions are subsumed within the larger issue of the
state's right to regulate charitable solicitation more aggressively and the ef-
fect such aggressive regulation might have on the charitable fund-raising
industry. It seems appropriate, therefore, that a review of and proposal for
charitable solicitation regulation be presented. This article undertakes to do
both. Part I is a summary review of key provisions of current state legisla-
tion. Part I does not consider regulation at the federal or municipal level
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Associate
Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.S., Capital University, 1974; J.D., Capital
University Law School, 1977. Former Assistant Attorney General, Charitable Foundations Sec-
tion, State of Ohio 1977-1979. The Charitable Foundations' Section is responsible for the enforce-
ment of the charitable trust, solicitation, and bingo acts of Ohio. I acknowledge the helpful
suggestions of Josiah Blackmore, James Phemister, and Frederic Kirgis, professors of law, Toba
Feldman, former colleague in the Charitable Foundations' Section, and Susan Nash and Martha
Dean, for their constructive comments in the preparation of this article.
1. Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Maryland, 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
2. Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Attorney General, 391 Mass. 709, 464 N.E.2d 55
(1984); Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Maryland, 48 Md. App. 273, 426
A.2d 985 (1981), aff'd, 294 Md. 134, 448 A.2d 935 (1982); Heritage Village Church and Mission-
ary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979), aff'd, 299 N.C. 399, 263
S.E.2d 726 (1980).
3. Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding unconstitutional a Dallas/Fort
Worth solicitation ordinance provision which created a rebuttable presumption that fund-raising
costs in excess of 25% of funds raised was excessive).
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although good reasons exist for regulation at the federal level4 and, as evi-
denced by the cases discussed, municipalitites have been quite active in reg-
ulating charitable solicitation.5 Part II is a review of the constitutional
limitations affecting regulatory measures and administering authorities fo-
cusing on early Supreme Court decisions. Part II is also devoted to a review
of various state and federal decisions, as well as subsequent decisions which
consider specific aspects of charitable solicitation. Emphasis is given to two
special concerns of governmental authorities: regulation of fund-raising cost
and regulation of organizations whose members are not the primary target
of solicitation activity. Part III contains proposals for charitable solicitation
legislation and comments. Draft provisions follow as appendices.
The Nature of Giving, Abuse and Regulation
For many people, charitable giving is based on religious tenets.6 For
others, a sense of moral obligation or a desire to help others provides a
similar driving force for giving. Tax benefits provide yet another reason for
the charitable bounty of others.7 Whatever the reason, individual and cor-
porate giving to a myriad of causes continues."
Current economic ills have increased dramatically the number of indi-
viduals and programs dependant upon the services provided by charitable
organizations. 9 As federal, state, and local governments reduce their spend-
ing for social and charitable programs, charitable organizations are finding
it more difficult to meet and provide for those needs and programs.' In
response to this situation, individuals and corporations are being urged to
increase their charitable giving." To some extent, economic policy is being
formulated to reflect the assumption that there will be increased giving.' 2
4. See Hopkins, A Case for Federal Regulation of Fund Raising for Philanthropy, PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY, Apr. 1976, at 26; For a general discussion of federal regulation of fund raising, see B.
HOPKINS, CHARITY UNDER SIEGE 181-237 (1980).
5. Many of the cases discussed herein involve municipal ordinances. See general discussion of cases in
Part II.
6. See, e.g., Gospel Army v. The City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982).
8. According to the American Association of Fund-Raising Council, Inc., approximately $74.25 bil-
lion were given to charitable organizations in 1984. This was in comparison to the $66.82, $60.39,
$53.62 and $47.74 billion given respectively in the years 1983 to 1980, inclusive. The increase in
giving from 1983 to 1984 was 11.1%. A similar increase in giving has occurred for each of the
years 1980 to 1983. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNCIL, INC., ANNUAL RE-
PORT, GIVING U.S.A. (1981-1985) [hereinafter cited as GIVING U.S.A.].
9. See generally Schussheim, The Reagan 1987 Budget and the Homeless, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE
REV., June 1986, at 3; Belous, Cashell & LeGrande, What's Happening to the Middle Class and
Income Inequality in America?, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REV., Mar. 1986, at 2; Shipp, Poverty:
Trends, Causes, and Cures, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REV., Feb. 1984, at 6; AMERICAN ASSOCI-
ATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNCIL, INC., ANNUAL REPORT, GIVING U.S.A. 64 (1981) (com-
ments of John J. Schwartz).
10. Bogdanich, It's Hard to Tell Good Charities From the Bad, Wall St. J., Aug. 25, 1985, at 23, col. 2;
How Budget Cuts Hurt Nonprofit Groups, Wash. Post, August 18, 1983, at A27, col. 1; Quinn, The
Charities Come Up Short, NEWSWEEK, January 3, 1983, at 61.
11. Remarks at Breakfast Meeting with Representatives From the Private Sector Engaged in Volun-
teer Work, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1008 (September 28, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12329
President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1129 (Octo-
ber 19, 1981).
12. President Reagan, in formulating his economic recovery program, assumed there would be greater
support for various charitable programs:
Historically, the American people have supported by voluntary contributions more artistic
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According to the American Asssociation of Fund-Raising Council,
Inc.,' 3 donations to charitable organizations have increased.' 4 The findings
further show that individuals, collectively, gave more in the years 1980 to
1984 than corporations or foundations. t5 This finding is significant in the
context of this article because individuals, as opposed to corporations or
foundations, are least able or willing to judge the credibility of solicitation
campaigns and, therefore, are in need of a greater degree of regulatory pro-
tection than corporations or foundations.' 6 In short, benefactors are en-
couraged to give, are predisposed to giving and, in fact, are giving more.
But the very motivation which leads to charitable giving, including the
acceptance of the challenge for increased giving, also provides an opportu-
nity for fraud and abuse. Kind-hearted benefactors become easy prey for
those whose intentions are not as honorable.17 Such fraud or abuse includes
deception regarding the nature of the charitable cause, fraudulent use of the
name of reputable charitable organizations, diversion of substantial
amounts of solicited funds into fund-raising cost-usually to professional
fund raisers and solicitors who have no connection with the charitable
cause other than to serve as fund raisers-and diversion of solicited funds
into administrative coffers away from charitable programming and
services. 18
Legislators and other governmental authorities attempt under the aegis
of police power to protect both the benefactor and the beneficiaries of chari-
table giving from the fraud and abuses of the unscrupulous. Confining our
discussion to state legislation, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
have statutes regulating or pertaining to charitable solicitation.19 Although
these statutes vary in their approach, scope, and application, they are all
aimed at promoting responsible charitable giving, fund raising, and fund
and cultural activities than all the other countries in the world put together. I wholeheart-
edly support this approach and believe that Americans will continue their generosity.
Therefore, I'm proposing a savings of $85 million in the Federal subsidies now going to the
arts and humanities.
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 132 (February 18,
1981).
13. The American Association of Fund-Raising Council (hereinafter AAFRC) is a group of profes-
sional fund-raising counseling firms organized to create standards for and to clarify standings
about and distrust in the fund-raising industry. See GIVING U.S.A., supra note 8.
14. See supra note 8.
15. Of the $74.25 billion estimated to have been given in 1984, 82.9% or $61.55 billion were given by
individuals. Since 1980 the percentage of giving by individuals has been between 80% and 83.7%.
See GIVING U.S.A., supra note 8.
16. See discussion in Part III, Sections D & E.
17. "The very worthiness of such purposes creates a risk that the charitable impulses of people may be
taken advantage of by solicitors who would collect funds under false pretenses or retain for them-
selves a undue percentage of what they collected." GospelArmy, 27 Cal. 2d at 245, 163 P.2d at 712,
713. During an interview with a witness in a solicitation fraud case, the witness indicated he had
been taught to not ask questions in giving to charity. William J. Brown v. Hamilton Productions,
No. 78-CV-12-5812 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 13, 1981). Unfortunately for responsible
giving, many people have this principle instilled in them and consequently, make no effort to dis-
cern the legitimacy of fund-raising campaigns.
18. See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 4.
19. See infra note 31; THE PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, SURVEY OF STATE LAWS REGULATING
CHARITABLE SOLICITATION (1985) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY]. This work contains a summary
of state laws regulating charitable solicitations and includes a combined state contract person list
and statutes regulating charitable gambling. See also B. HOPKINS, supra note 4.
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management by reducing the potential for the fraud and abuse associated
with charitable solicitation while, at the same time, attempting to avoid im-
posing an undue burden on charities and the fund-raising industry.
Before moving to Part I, two points, inferred by the above brief discus-
sion, need comment. First, charitable fund raising is a billion dollar indus-
try.20 Notwithstanding what may at first appear to be self-serving assertions
by professional fund raisers, these individuals and firms provide a needed
and useful service assisting charitable organizations in obtaining the dollars
needed to provide important and vital services. 2' Professional fund-raising
associations have been formed and are striving to enhance the credibility
and professionalism of professional fund raisers and the fund-raising indus-
try through the adoption of standards for their members.22 It would be a
grave mistake not to recognize and encourage a continuation of this service,
even though some fund raisers are unscrupulous.
Second, the state has an interest in regulating charitable solicitation,
although an articulation of this interest in many of the cases is not usually
explored beyond a statement that an interest exists in protecting citizens
from fraud and misrepresentation. 3 In addition to protecting citizens from
fraud and misrepresentation and making it easier for them to make in-
formed decisions, there is also an interest in assuring efficient acquisition
and utilization of charitable dollars.24 This interest results in part from the
reduction of the burden on government to provide either the services or the
necessary resources for some other entity to replace services currently being
handled by charitable organizations with solicited dollars.25 One should not
20. See supra notes 8, 15. See also Note, The Regulation of Charitable Fund-Raising and Spending
Activities, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1158.
21. Fund-raising is a profession, just as accounting and law, which the nonprofit organization
cannot delegate to unqualified practitioners if it hopes to enjoy successful fund-raising re-
sults. Experienced fund-raisers have developed expertise in the planning and conduct of
fund-raising strategies and techniques that are lacking in inexperienced nonprofessionals.
Depending on the size and objectives of the institution, the professional fundraising capabil-
ity may be met by one manager, a staff with specific expertise in diverse fund-raising tech-
niques (research, writing, direct mail, planned giving, capital campaign, etc.), or by
employment of a professional fund-raising consultant or firm to provide counsel or supple-
mental services.
B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 28.
22. AAFRC, Inc. and National Society of Fund Raising Executives are two such organizations. See
Fair Practice Code of AAFRC, Inc., in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNCIL,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT, GIVING U.S.A. 111 (1985) (a list of other organizations associated with
philanthropy is also contained therein). There are also some private watchdog groups concerned
with charitable fund-raising; the most noted of which is the Philanthropic Advisory Service of the
Council of Better Business Bureau. This organization has also adopted standards for fund raising
activity and professional fund raisers.
23. See generally cases and discussion in Part II.
24. "Despite these unresolved problems, there remains substantial unanimity on one goal: The greatest
possible portion of the wealth donated to private charity must be conserved and used to further the
charitable, public purpose; waste must be minimized and diversion of funds for private gain is
intolerable." Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollars: An Unfilled State Responsibility, 73
HARV. L. REV. 433, 434 (1960). See also dissent in Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2859, 2860 & n.2. But see
Stevenson, Regulation in the 80's, A New Approach, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Jan. 1980, at 34,
35. Because giving is neither "mandatory nor necessary," Stevenson contends that the state has no
interest like that involving other consumer legislation. Id. at 35.
25. To the extent programs and services which have been provided for by governments can be under-
taken by the private sector, the government is free to budget its dollars for other purposes. The
expectation is that individual and corporate giving to organizations providing needed and valuable
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be misled, however, into thinking that reducing the burden is a benefit be-
longing solely to the government. The primary benefit is to charitable orga-
nizations and the recipients of charitable services. In some cases those
services are provided more efficiently by community-based organizations
than by the government. The relief provided in the reduction of the burden
on government is secondary.
Funds received and held following a solicitation are also in the nature of
a charitable trust corpus and evoke applicable trust principles.26 Two such
principles-giving effect to the donor's intent and prohibiting the diversion
of funds from the trust purposes-have specific application to charitable
solicitations. Thus, where the donor is led to believe that the lion's share of
contributed funds will be used for the charitable purposes articulated in the
solicitation campaign, application of these trust principles operate to pre-
vent the diversion of a substantial portion of those funds to other pur-
poses.27 These principles are applicable even though there is no formal trust
or trust document.28 Soliciting funds specifically or ostensibly for charitable
purposes creates a charitable trust.2 9 States have historically served as the
monitor and enforcer of charitable trusts.3°
social programs and services will increase. President Reagan assumed as much and made it a part
of his economic policy. Supra notes 11 and 12. While this assumption has proved true, it is
recognized that many programs and services will be lost because of the inability of the private
sector to pick up the entire slack left open by the withdrawal of government dollars. See GIVING
U.S.A., supra note 8, at 4-5, 103 (comments by John Grenzebach and John J. Schwartz, Chairper-
son and President, respectively, of the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel).
26. As in the case of the making of a contract so in the case of a trust an objective rather than a
substantive test is applied. It is the manifestation of intention which controls and not the
actual intention where that differs from the manifestation of intention. An express trust may
be created even though the parties do not call it a trust, and even though they do not under-
stand precisely what a trust is, it is sufficent if what they appear to have in mind is in its
essentials what the courts mean when they speak of a trust.
SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 28 (3rd ed. 1967), quoted in William J. Brown v. R.E. Holloway, No. CA
6689, slip op. at 14 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio, July 15, 1981). The Holloway court held
that the sales pitches used in connection with the solicitation campaign showed as a matter of law
that there was an express charitable trust of the net proceeds of the campaign "[e]ven though the
Fireman and Holloway did not mention the words 'trust' or 'charity."' Id. at 14.
The trust theory was alluded to in Jones v. American Home Finding Association, 191 Iowa
211, 182 N.W. 191 (1921), where the court held that a fund-raising fee of 50% of gross contribu-
tions for a charitable organization was against public policy. The court stated:
The officers of the defendant association have no authority to contract in relation to funds
coming into their possession to carry out the purposes of the corporation, whereby private
persons would reap the benefits of bequests, as in the instant case. It would be an unwar-
ranted diversion of such funds which would tend to shock the public conscience. A charita-
ble institution must remain true to the purpose of its creation. Trust funds are in its hands,
and it is not permitted to divert those funds for private gain on its own behalf or on behalf
of those who are in its employ. Public policy does not permit this.
191 Iowa at 214, 182 N.W. at 192. See also Brown v. Concerned Citizens for Sickle Cell Anemia,
Inc., 56 Ohio St. 2d 85, 382 N.E.2d 1155 (1978) (holding that funds received in connection with a
bingo game operated ostensibly for charitable purposes gave rise to a charitable trust).
27. Id.
28. ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 28 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 24, 351 (1959).
29. See Brown v. Concerned Citizens, 56 Ohio St. 2d 85, 382 N.E.2d 1155 (1978); Jones v. American
Home, 121 Iowa 211, 182 N.W. 191 (1921); Brown v. Holloway, No. CA 6689, slip op. at 14 (Ct.
App. Montgomery County, Ohio, July 15, 1981).
30. One of the recognized powers held by the attorney general at common law was "to inquire
into any abuses of charitable donations." [citations omitted] Clearly, the attorney general's
traditional power to protect public donations to charity goes beyond the mere enforcement of
express trusts where the formal elements of such trust-manifestation of intent to create a
trust, the existence of trust property, and a fiduciary relationship-are essential to its crea-
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The question thus becomes to what extent can governmental authorities
actively proceed to use their police power to safeguard these interests.
I. STATE STATUTES REGULATING CHARITABLE
SOLICITATIONS
Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have statutes regulating
charitable solicitation. 3' Three of these thirty-six states have enacted or
amended satutes since 1980 to regulate charitable solicitation.32 A few addi-
tional states have provisions affecting some aspect of charitable solicitation,
although these provisions do not rise to the level of a charitable solicitation
regulatory scheme.33 Considerable difference in the regulatory approach is
taken among the states with statutes. No attempt is made here to review
and present the entire regulatory scheme of all the states. Instead, the more
important statutory provisions which relate directly to the issue of preven-
tion of solicitation fraud and abuse will be considered.34
A. Licensing, Registration, Permits, Reporting and Contracts
Most of the statutes require as a precondition to charitable solicitation
either the acquisition of a license/permit from the appropriate regulatory
agency or, at a minimum, registration with the agency. 35 Typical of licens-
tion . . . . The attorney general, in seeking to protect the public interest, may also bring suit
to impose a constructive trust on funds collected for charitable purposes but subsequently
diverted to other purposes. [citations omitted] A constructive trust, although not a formal
trust at all, serves as a means to prevent the unjust enrichment of those who would abuse
their voluntary roles as public solicitors for charity. [citations omitted] For this court to hold
that the attorney general can only enforce express charitable trusts would greatly hamper his
ability to carry out his statutory and common law duties.
Brown v. Concerned Citizens, 56 Ohio St. 2d. at 90-91, 382 N.E.2d. at 1158.
31. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See generally SURVEY, supra note 19.
32. California amended its statute in 1980 to include "solicitation" in the statute regulating sales solici-
tation for charitable purposes. It now reads "Solicitation or Sales Solicitation for Charitable Pur-
poses." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 17510.3 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985); Louisiana and New Mexico
enacted charitable solicitation statutes in 1981 and 1983, respectively. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.1901 et seq. (West 1965 & Supp. 1985) (enacted 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-22-1 et seq.
(1978 & Supp. 1983).
33. Colorado, for example, has a statutory provision prohibiting charitable fraud. A person commits
charitable fraud by (a) soliciting or receiving "contributions for a purpose or use which, by affirma-
tive representations or through lack of adequate disclosure, leads the person or persons, to whom
the solicitation is made or from whom the contribution is received, reasonably to believe that such
will be used for the primary benefit of a charitable organization while not intending that such
contributions will be so used .... " (b) using the name of a person or organization without con-
sent in a charitable solicitation, (c) using names or symbols closely related to those of other chari-
ties in a solicitation, or (d) failing to maintain complete records for three years. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-5-115 (1973 & Supp. 1984) (amended 1984).
34. For a full summary presentation of all state statutes see, SURVEY, supra note 19; B. HOPKINS,
supra note 4. The statutes cited in the following footnotes are provided as examples and do not
foreclose other state provisions.
35. The statutes typically require the soliciting organization to submit an application or a registration
statement containing information such as: the name and purpose of organization, principal address
of organization and officials, the name and address of chapters within the state, the existence of
tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, financial records from preceding years (usu-
ally audited by an independent public accountant), specific financial records of prior fund raising
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ing statutes is North Carolina's requirement that "[a]ny person who solicits
charitable contributions shall apply for and obtain an annual license."
3 6
Pennsylvania's statute is representative of registration statutes requiring
charitable organizations intending to solicit "prior to any solicitation, [to]
file a registration statement" with the appropriate department.37 Iowa, in a
constitutionally suspect statute, requires soliciting organizations to "first
[obtain] a permit."3 8
Upon receipt of the application or registration statement, the action to
be taken by the agency varies among the statutes. Some statutes, without
clear direction, contemplate that if the requested information is provided,
then the organization may proceed with the solicitation.3 9 Other statutes,
however, provide specifically for action to be taken following submission of
the requested information.4" It is often provided that the agency may make
a reasonable investigation to determine the correctness of the information
provided in the application or registration, or whether any provision of the
law has been or is about to be violated."a A license, permit, or registration
may be denied not only for the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the applica-
tion or registration statement, but also for violations of other provisions in
the statute.42
activity, intention to use professional fund raisers or solicitors, the general purpose for which the
contributions are solicited, the name under which the organization will solicit, copies of contracts
between the charitable organization and professional fund raisers or solicitors, a statement as to
whether the organization has ever been enjoined from soliciting charitable contributions, and the
names of individuals who will have custody of funds or who will be responsible for their distribu-
tion. See MINN. STATE ANN. § 309.52 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172, 173a
(McKinney 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-3(a) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985). Statutes also
permit the administrative agency to request additional information. For example, the Minnesota
statute provides that the registration statement is to include "such other information as the depart-
ment may by rule or order require to promote fairness of the solution and to assure full and fair
disclosure of all material information . MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309-5 2 (l)(p) (West 1969 &
Supp. 1985).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-4 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-3(a) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985).
38. The Iowa statute first requires the organization to be incorporated under Iowa law or authorized to
do business in Iowa. It then requires that the organization obtain a permit from the secretary of
state conditioned upon the application of all donations "directly to the purpose stated and for
which the donations were given." The secretary of state is vested with "full discretion as to whom
he will issue permits, and shall satisfy himself before issuing any such permit that the applicant is
reputable and that the purposes for which donations from the public are to be solicited are legitimate
and worthy." IOWA CODE ANN. § 122.1 (West 1984) (emphasis added). This statute would seem-
ingly be unconstitutional as being vague and vesting too much discretion in an official. See infra
Part II and discussion of Hynes, infra notes 143-53.
39. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.02 (Baldwin 1982).
40. For example, Florida provides that each application is to be examined and if it is in conformity
"with the requirement of ... [the] chapter and all relevant rules and regulations" it shall be
approved. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.05 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985). See also the District of Columbia
statute requiring the issuance of a certificate of registration within ten days after an application has
been filed provided the required information has been disclosed. D.C. CODE ANN. § 704(c) (1981).
In North Carolina an organization is free to solicit charitable contributions until notified that the
application has been denied. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13 1C-4(b) (1981 & Supp. 1983). At an extreme is
the Iowa statute which allows the agency issuing permits to "satisfy ... [itself] before issuing...
any permits that the applicant is reputable and that the purposes for which donations from the
public are to be solicited are legitimate and worthy. IOWA CODE ANN. § 122.1 (West 1984).
41. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-187(a) (West 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-18 (Supp.
1985).
42. For example, the North Carolina statute permits the denial of a license if "charitable contributions
have or are not being applied for the purpose or purposes stated in the application." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131C-1 l(a)(4) (Supp. 1985). The Connecticut and Hawaii statutes permit denial where the
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Updating of information on the application or registration form is also a
significant aspect of the application or registration process. Most statutes
require an annual or periodic updating of information along with the filing
of financial data.43 The required financial data typically includes informa-
tion on gross contributions pledged and collected, distribution of gross re-
ceipts, identification of professional fund raisers or solicitors, any contracts
between fund raisers, and financial records." Financial reports often must
be certified by an independent public accountant.45 Annual reporting, as
well as agency investigation, is facilitated by a requirement in some statutes
that the organization must maintain specified financial and non-financial
records.46
B. Exemption from Registration or Licensing
Charitable solicitation statutes typically exempt certain organizations
from their licensing or registration requirements. Exemptions vary from
statute to statute, but generally include churches, 47 religious organiza-
tions,4" educational organizations, 49 and membership organizations.5" Small
solicitations are exempted under most statutes, although the ceiling amount
varies from statute to statute. 51 Other exemptions include libraries, muse-
ums, hospitals, health care institutions, solicitation for specified individuals,
and veterans organizations.52 An organization, otherwise exempt, may lose
proceeds of a solicitation are used for fund-raising cost which exceed a statutory maximum. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-179, -187(d) (West 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 467B-7, -10(b) (1976
& Supp. 1984).
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103B (1957 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.04 (Baldwin 1982).
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103B (1957 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.04 (Baldwin 1982).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-179 (West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.04 (Baldwin
1982); VA. CODE § 57-49(a) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
46. CONN. GEN. STATE ANN. § 21a-183 (West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.04 (Baldwin
1982); VA. CODE § 57-53 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-11 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
47. Under the Florida statute, religious institutions are not considered charitable organizations. Only
charitable organizations not specifically falling within an exemption must register prior to solicit-
ing. Churches are included within the definition of religious institutions. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 496.02(1)(a)-(b), 496.04 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985).
48. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.515(1)(b) (Supp. 1985); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-a(1) (McKinney 1982)
(exempts from entire act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-5(b) (Supp. 1985) (exempts only from registra-
tion provision). The former Minnesota statute exempting only religious organizations receiving
more than half of their contributions in the preceding accounting year from members of the organ-
ization, parent organizations of affiliates or some combination of members and affiliate groups was
held unconstitutional in 1982 in Valente v. Larson. See discussion infra Part II Section (B)(2)(b).
49. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5103(b) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1985) (solicitation limited to
constituency); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.515(l)(c) (Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-5(d)
(Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 57-60(a)(1) (Supp. 1985) (solicitation limited to constituency).
50. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.283(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-
4(b)(3) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 57-60(a)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1985). Membership is
defined in some statutes to exclude individuals who become members after making a contribution.
E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-4(b)(3) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985). Michigan provides an
exemption to any organization that "does not invite the general public to become a member of the
organization and confines solicitation activities . . . among its members." MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 40.283 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
51. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5006(l)(D) (1980) ($10,000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 103C(a)(B) (1957 & Supp. 1984) ($5,000); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172(a)(2)(d) (McKinney 1982)
($10,000); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-4(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (requires short form registra-
tion for solicitations under $15,000).
52. See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 93; SURVEY, supra note 19.
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that exemption if it employs a professional fund raiser or pays solicitors."
At least three valid reasons exist for exempting some organizations from
the licensing or registration requirements of a statute. First, if the solicita-
tion is confined to an organization's membership or to a defined constitu-
ency of the organization, therefore not involving a public solicitation,54 the
interest of the state in protecting the general public from fraud and abuse is
not furthered by requiring these organizations to comply with the statute. 55
Second, if the amount of money to be solicited is small, the state may want
to concentrate its administrative resources and attention on organizations
which affect the general public to a greater extent.56 Additionally, organiza-
tions which get a relatively small amount of financial support from the pub-
lic are more likely to be small organizations. Requiring these organizations
to comply with registration or licensing provisions may be cost prohibitive
and may effectively put them out of operation. Third, if a separate govern-
mental or quasi-governmenal agency already exercises a regulatory function
over the organization similar to that which the charitable solicitation regu-
latory agency would perform, little additional benefit would be gained by
requiring compliance with the licensing or registration provisions." More-
over, the organization would suffer a double burden and government re-
sources would be wasted. The exemptions for educational organizations and
hospitals are two good examples of unnecessary double regulation.58
C. Licensing or Registration of Professional Fund Raisers
Most states regulating charitable solicitation require the registration or
licensing of professional fund raisers5 9 and solicitors6' and prohibit a person
53. Minnesota exempts religious organizations, small solicitations, and certain organizations soliciting
from its members unless a professional fund raiser is employed to solicit or assist in the solicitation.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.515(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1985). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 103C(a)(3) (1957 & Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-6(a)(3) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
54. As used throughout this article a "public" solicitation or solicitation of the "general public" means
a solicitation of individuals or organizations who are neither members of the organization nor
invited to become members following a donation as a result of the solicitation. See supra note 50. It
would serve no useful purpose to try an attempt to establish a minimum number of non-member
targets of a solicitation campaign, whether specific or stated as a percentage, at which all persons
would readily agree that there is public solicitation. Under this definition, the solicitation of one
non-member involves a public solicitation. However, authorities regulating charitable solicitation
will hardly direct money and people resources to regulate a solicitation involving only one person.
As the number of non-member donors targeted for solicitation request increases, the solicitation
becomes "more public." It is asserted throughout this article, and particularly in Part II, Section
(B)(2)(b), infra, that the state's interest and willingness to become involved in "actively" regulating
public solicitations is directly related to the number of non-members targeted in solicitation cam-
paigns among other factors. Under most circumstances, the need to resort to a definition of public
solicitation will be of no moment since the solicitation will be directed at the general public in the
ordinary sense.
55. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 90.
56. Id.
57. Streich v. Pennsylvania Commission on Charitable Organizations, 579 F. Supp. 172, 179 (M.D.
Pa. 1984).
58. Educational organizations are typically exempted if they are accredited by regional or state accred-
iting associations or are under the supervision of a state board of education. This exemption usu-
ally includes foundations or departments directly associated with the educational institution (see
supra note 49). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.09.030(7) (1980 & Supp. 1985) which ex-
empts "volunteer hospital organizations affiliated with nonprofit hospitals where budgets are sub-
ject to review by" the Washington hospital commission.
59. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-181 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.531 (West Supp.
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from acting as such unless registered or licensed.6 Like the charitable or-
ganization itself, the professional fund raiser or solicitor must apply or file a
registration statement with the agency disclosing information such as name,
names and addresses of employees, and prior activity including any out-
standing injunctions prohibiting solicitations or criminal convictions for
embezzlement.62 A bond is generally required to be filed by the fund raiser
or solicitor.6 3
D. Regulation of Fund-Raising Costs'
A number of states impose limitations on the precentage of solicited
dollars which may be used for fund raising as part of their regulatory
scheme.65 A typical statute imposes a percentage limitation upon the
amount a professional fund raiser or solicitor may receive as compensa-
tion.66 While imposing a limitation, many of the statutes permit charitable
organizations exceeding the limitation to solicit if the organization can
demonstrate that the higher costs are nonetheless reasonable or that special
circumstances exist necessitating higher costs.67
E. Disclosure and Solicitor Information Cards
A few states make disclosure a part of any charitable solicitation.68
Maine requires disclosure at the time of the solicitation only if less than
seventy percent of the total contributed dollars will be used for program
services.69 In that event, "the estimated percentage of each dollar contrib-
1985); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173 (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-6 (1981 & Supp.
1983). For definition of professional fund raiser, see infra note 278.
60. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173-b (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-C (1981 and Supp. 1983).
For definition of professional solicitor, see infra note 279.
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.531 (West Supp. 1985). See also supra note 59.
62. See supra note 59.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-10 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.05 (Baldwin 1982).
64. See infra Part II, Section B(2)(a) for discussion of the constitutionality of percentage limitations or
fund-raising costs.
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-179 (West 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 467B-7 (1976 & Supp.
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5109(c) (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 68, §§ 21-22 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309-555 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-6 (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985).
66. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 467B-7 (1976 & Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 68, § 21 (West
1969 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.5555 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 160-6 (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985).
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309-555(5) (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-6
(Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D(a) (1957 & Supp. 1984)
(declared unconstitutional in Munson, 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984)).
68. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.3-.4 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-705 (1981
& Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5012 (1980); VA. CODE §§ 57-55.1, -56 (1981 &
Supp. 1985).
69. It shall be a violation of this chapter for a professional fund-raising counsel, professional
solicitor, commercial co-venturer or any other person to solicit contributions from a prospec-
tive donor in this State without fully disclosing to the prospective donor at the time of solici-
tation the estimated percentage of each dollar contributed which will be expended for
program services, fund raising and management when less than 70% of the amount contrib-
uted will be expended for program services. In addition, any person required to register
under section 5008, or any of his agents, who solicits contributions shall disclose to the
prospective donor at the time of the solicitation the percentage of the gross contribution
which will constitute his compensation and all fund-raising expenses connected with that
particular contract.
Charitable Solicitation
uted which will be expended for program services, fund raising and man-
agement" must be disclosed.7" If the person soliciting is a professional fund
raiser or solicitor, that individual must disclose his compensation and all
fund-raising expenses as a percentage of gross contributions.7
California and the District of Columbia achieve disclosure by requiring
the individual soliciting to exhibit a "solicitor information card" or other
printed material containing information required on the card.72 The card
must contain information regarding the name and address of the organiza-
tion on whose behalf the solicitation is made, the amount-as a percentage
of total receipts-that will be used for fund-raising expenses, whether and
to what extent the contribution is tax deductible, and the tax exempt status
of the organization.73 If radio, television, or telephone is used instead of
personal contact, a solicitor is nevertheless required to give essentially the
same information by tendering the card prior to any actual acceptance of
the contribution.74
F. Enforcement and Penalties
The statutes contain provisions prohibiting certain actions in connection
with a charitable solicitation. It is apparent in reviewing these provisions
that they are aimed at preventing fraud, misrepresentation, and confusion.
The prohibitions may include the following: prohibition against the unau-
thorized use of the name of another person (including charitable organiza-
tions); prohibition against the use of related or similar names, symbols, or
statements of another person which tend to confuse or mislead; prohibition
against the use of fraud, misrepresentations, misleading statements, or de-
ceptive practices with intent to confuse or mislead a person to believe that a
charitable organization is involved or that the funds will be used for chari-
table purposes and programs; and prohibition against using the fact of regis-
tration or licensing as an endorsement of the solicitation campaign by
another organization or governmental agency. 75 Other prohibited acts in-
clude: employing solicitors wearing uniforms of local, state, or federal
govenmental agencies or departments; 76 soliciting on behalf of charitable
organizations by professional solicitors without written authorization from
the organization; 77 selling of lists of contributors by one charitable organi-
zation to one another;78 accepting more than a specified sum of money
without providing a receipt if requested by the donor;79 and soliciting by a
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5012 (1980).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17510.3-17510.4 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
705 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
73. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.3 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
74. Id.; D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-705(b) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.55 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-12
(Purdon 1965); VA. CODE § 57-57 (1981 & Supp. 1985); B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 101-02.
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.55(4) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-12(e) (Purdon 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103J(e) (1957 &
Supp. 1984).
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.55(6) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
79. VA. CODE § 57.57(g) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
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person who has been convicted of embezzlement, larceny, or previously en-
joined by a court from soliciting. 0
Penalties for contravening any of the prohibited acts, as well as other
provisions of the statutory scheme, include revocation, cancellation, or de-
nial of a registration, license, or permit.8 ' Statutes also provide for fines 2
and criminal penalties 3 and the availability of injunctive relief.8 4 Georgia
statutorily provides individuals, injured as a result of a violation of the solu-
tion statute, with a private cause of action. 5 Furthermore, specific author-
ity to investigate organizations is provided in some statutes.8 6 This
authority may be vested in the secretary of state, the agency, the attorney
general, or all of these simultaneously. 87
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHARITABLE
SOLICITATION REGULATION
A. Solicitation and the First Amendment-Early Decisions
Any state or local government wishing to enact legislation regulating
charitable solicitations must be cognizant of the federal constitutional limi-
tations imposed upon such legislation by the United States Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court 8 and other federal and state court deci-
sions. A review and analysis of those decisions is necessary to both a cri-
tique of current legislation and the development of proposed legislation.
The first amendment as made applicable to state and local governments
by the fourteenth amendment is the most significant constitutional limita-
tion affecting the validity of charitable solicitation legislation. Inasmuch as
many religious organizations solicit funds in order to carry out their chari-
table and religious purposes, the first amendment's prohibition of laws
which prevent the free exercise of religion and the establishment of religion
becomes significant in judicial challenges to such legislation. 9 Similarly,
because charitable solicitation may be entwined with the communication of
80. Id. § 57.57(n)(j). An organization may be prohibited from soliciting if an officer, professional fund
raiser, or solicitor of the organization would be prevented from soliciting under this type of provi-
sion. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.13(2) (West 1972 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.532(1) (West
1969 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-14(a) (Purdon 1965).
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-187(d) (West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 68, § 32(d)
(West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.99 (Baldwin 1982).
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-187(d) (West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 68, § 32(d)
(West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.99 (Baldwin 1982).
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103L(c) (1957 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-21 (Supp.
1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 160-14(f) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1985).
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-15(a) (1984). In the alternative, a class action may be instituted by the
attorney general on behalf of injured individuals. Id. § 43-17-15(b). Exemplary damages and attor-
ney fees may also be awarded in addition to general damages under the statute if it is found that
the violations of the statute were intentional. Id. § 43-17-15(a).
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 187 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.13 (West 1972 & Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-13 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-15(b) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 187 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.13 (West 1972 & Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-13 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-15(b) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
88. The thrust of this article is on federal constitutional limitations on charitable solicitation regula-
tion, but state constitutional provisions may play a significant role in defining limits on such
regulation.
89. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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ideas or positions, the first amendment's protection of free speech plays a
significant role in establishing limitations for charitable solicitation legisla-
tion.9 ° Accordingly, governments are faced with the very difficult task of
regulating charitable solicitation activity without unnecessarily and unduly
infringing upon these protected rights.
The landmark decision setting the initial permissible limitations of char-
itable solicitation regulation is Cantwell v. Connecticut.91 A Connecticut
statute prohibited the solicitation of money, services, or anything of value
for any alleged charitable or religious cause unless an issuing authority had
given its approval and had issued a certificate to that effect. 92 The official
issuing the certificate had the authority to determine whether there existed
a religious cause or "an object of charity or philanthropy" and whether the
cause "conform[ed] to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity." '93
Conducting a solicitation without a certificate was punishable by fine or
imprisonment.94
Appellants in Cantwell, Jehovah's Witnesses, were arrested as a result of
their activity of going from house to house presenting information about
Jehovah's Witnesses and soliciting contributions for the publication of their
pamphlets.95 The Supreme Court held that the statute, on its face and as
applied, denied appellants' freedom of speech and prohibited their free exer-
cise of religion.96 Recognizing the first amendment's prohibition against leg-
islation which, on one hand, would compel individuals to accept a
particular creed or to practice a form of worship and, on the other hand,
would deny individuals the free exercise of their chosen form of religion, the
Court established that states may regulate the "times, places and manner"
of soliciting funds upon the street as well as safeguarding the "peace, good
order and comfort of the community." 97 Even in this statement of permissi-
ble regulation, however, the Court cautioned that "in attaining a permissi-
ble end," the government must be careful not to "unduly infringe [upon]
90. See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
91. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
92. No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged
religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the organization
for whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which such person or
organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the
public welfare council. Upon application of any person in behalf of such cause, the secretary
shall determine whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or
philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity, and, if he
shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the authority in charge a certificate to that
effect .... Any person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not more than
one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.
Id. at 301, 302.
93. Id. at 302.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 301.
96. Id. at 300.
97. It is equally clear that a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the
times, the places and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings
thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the com-
munity, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 304.
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the protected freedom."98
No one would contend that a state is without authority to protect its
citizens from fraud or abuse perpetrated under the cloak of religion. The
question, however, is to what extent may the state proceed to protect its
citizens when constitutional rights are affected. In Cantwell, the statute per-
mitted the issuing authority to determine whether a cause for which there
was to be a solicitation was a religious one, and the issuance of a certificate
depended upon the official's decision. In the context of freedom of religion,
the authority to determine what is a religious cause denies the protection
guaranteed by the first amendment.99 Cantwell provides that a legislative
enactment which does not involve a religious test or "unreasonably obstruct
or delay the collection of funds is permissible.'
If legislation is directly aimed at religion or religious beliefs, then it will
most certainly fall to the precepts of the Constitution.' Problems arise
when the statute is directed at regulating legitimate secular activity which
also may impose burdens on the exercise of religious freedom. The state has
a fundamental interest in the regulation of purely secular conduct for the
preservation of peace and order10 2 and the prevention of practices harmful
to society.t13 Testing the validity of solicitation legislation directed at these
permissible objectives by simply asking whether the legislation "unduly"
infringes upon religious freedom lacks guidance for both legislatures or the
individuals and organizations involved in charitable solicitation.
Cantwell was the seminal case and discussed charitable solicitation regu-
lation under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Prior to and
following that decision, the Court looked at solicitation legislation in the
context of free speech and press. " Legislation prohibiting on-the-street and
door-to-door solicitation has been successfully assailed as violative of free
speech and press in several cases.' 05 These cases provide helpful guidelines
in determining the permissible scope of charitable solicitation regulation in
98. Id. In other words, encompassed within the first amendment is the "freedom to believe and the
freedom to act," and in regulating conduct it is not permissible to regulate the freedom to believe
or to unduly infringe upon that freedom. Id. at 303-04. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
99. A good argument can be made that the delegation of discretion to the secretary of public welfare to
determine whether such cause is a "bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to
reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity" was unconstitutional in that unfettered discretion
is placed in the secretary. While the case does not appear to be decided on this point, it is touched
upon lightly by the parties and the Court. 310 U.S. at 306. See infra note 147 and accompanying
text.
100. 310 U.S. at 305, 307.
101. 310 U.S. 296.
102. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
103. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
104. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Hynes v.
Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
105. Martin v. Struther, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945) (declaring unconstitutional on first amendment grounds a statute requiring a per-
mit prior to any solicitation of memberships into a labor union). But see Broderick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding as not unconstitutional on its face a statute which prohibited civil
service workers from soliciting or receiving contributions on behalf of political organizations, per-
sons or purposes).
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light of free speech and press although they do not all involve charitable
solicitation.
In Lovell v. City of Griffin,'06 the Supreme Court held invalid on its face
an ordinance which prevented the distribution of "literature of any kind
• . . without first obtaining written permission . .. ,,107 The Court found
that the statute was not specifically aimed at literature which was "obscene
or offensive to public morals or that advocate[d] unlawful conduct."' l The
ordinance contained no restrictions respecting littering, conducting of a
nuisance on a public street, or maintaining order, which, assuming reasona-
bleness, would have been proper "times, places or manner" restrictions.' 09
The ordinance as written, however, was fatally overbroad with respect to
free speech rights, sweeping within its prohibition every type of distribution
and every type of literature, including the distribution of religious
pamphlets.
Four ordinances considered by the Court in Schneider v. State °" 0 also
failed to satisfy first amendment guarantees, in spite of findings by the re-
spective state courts that the ordinances were reasonable times, places, or
manner restrictions, and thus were distinguishable from the Lovell ordi-
nance.11' The Supreme Court noted that although municipal authorities
may enact regulations to protect public safety, health and welfare, or con-
venience, such regulation cannot abridge constitutional rights, particularly
where alternative means to achieving the same result are available."' While
these alternative means may be less efficient or convenient, efficiency and
convenience cannot alone support an abridgment of constitutional rights.113
Similarly, the prevention of fraud cannot be the basis for broadly and indis-
106. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
107. Id. at 447-48.
108. Id. at 451.
109. Id.
110. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The case involved ordinances from Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wis-
consin; Worcester, Massachusetts; and Irvington, New Jersey.
111. The state court determined a Los Angeles ordinance to be a reasonable regulation because its
prohibition permitted distribution in designated places, unlike the ordinance in Lovell which pro-
hibited distribution anywhere in the city. A Milwaukee ordinance was distinguished by its state
court because its purpose was "to prevent an unsightly, untidy, and offensive condition of the
sidewalks." Id. at 156. Lovell was held inapplicable as the ordinance in that case was not aimed at
the prevention of littering. Id. The court held Worcester's ordinance, which pertained to distribu-
tions on the public streets and ways and left all other places, both public and private, open for
distributions, a valid regulation of the use of the streets. Id. at 157. The ordinance in Lovell was
also distinguished from an Irvington ordinance, the latter held valid by the state court as a permis-
sible regulation against fraudulent activity. Id at 159.
112. In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights (freedom of speech and
press) is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legisla-
tion. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the cir-
cumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regu-
lation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Id. at 161.
113. Justice Murphy, concurring in Martin v. Struthers, writes, "Prohibition may be more convenient to
the law maker and easier to fashion than a regulatory measure which adequately protects the peace
and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate religious activites. But that does not justify
a repressive enactment like the one now before us." Martin, 319 U.S. at 151 (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
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criminantly prohibiting the exercise of first amendment rights of free speech
and free press. Instead, authorities may enact laws prohibiting and punish-
ing fraud or trespass, 14 thereby directly regulating harmful and prohibited
activity. 15
In Martin v. Struthers,t1 6 an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
handbills, the ringing of door bells, or otherwise summoning occupants to
the door for receiving handbills, circulars, or advertisements was declared
unconstitutional.' In rejecting the city's argument that the ordinance pro-
tected its residents from intrusion during rest hours or from burglars posing
as canvassers, the Court held that the ordinance denied canvassers their
right to freedom of speech and free press by denying them the ability to
transmit information door-to-door."18
For the most part, the legislation at issue in these cases concerned non-
commercial speech, recognized as protected by the Constitution. Commer-
cial speech was thought to be outside constitutional protection." 9
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer
Counsel, Inc., 120 however, the Supreme Court held that commercial speech
was protected by the first amendment. The Court recognized that commer-
cial speech, in and of itself, is not so removed from any "exposition of
ideas" or "truth, science, morality, and the arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government" as to be without
constitutional protection.' 2 ' Commercial speech may in fact be tied to the
free flow of information, 22 as well as religion, political speech, or speech
communicating ideas or positions, all of which are protected.' 23 Therefore,
commercial speech entitled to protection is protected because of its nature
and content. 124 Similarly, if commercial speech is unprotected, it is becuase
114. Cantwell, supra note 91; Schneider, supra note 110.
115. The ordinances failed due to indirectness in regulating legitimate concerns and also due to over-
breadth. The ordinances simply prevented all distributions in designated areas.
116. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
117. Id. at 142.
118. The Court determined that this type of legislation substituted the will and judgment of the commu-
nity or authorities for the will and judgment of the individual householder. Id. at 144, 148. A
general trespass ordinance or statute which allows individual householders to decide whether they
are willing to receive literature was an alternative more closely aimed at protecting householders
from the evils identified.
119. In Schneider, the court intimated that commercial solicitation and canvassing may be subject to
regulation: "We are not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not
be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance requires." 308 U.S. at 165. Reaffirming this dicta,
the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) upheld an ordinance similar in many
respects to those discussed above but which was applicable only to commercial and business adver-
tising. Id. at 53 n.1. The Court stated:
[W]e are clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a
gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation
of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.
Id. at 54.
120. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
121. Id. at 762.
122. Id. at 765.
123. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
124. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because
money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Speech
likewise is protected even though it carried in a form that is "sold" for profit, . . . and even
though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money.
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of its nature and content.
The Supreme Court gave additional impetus to the Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy decision in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment,125 a case specifically involving a charitable solicitation ordinance.
The ordinance required every charitable organization, which used or in-
tended to use door-to-door solicitation within the village to apply for a per-
mit.' 26 Additionally, the ordinance required "[s]atisfactory proof that at
least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitation will be used
directly for the charitable purpose of the organization."' 127 Respondent, a
not-for-profit corporation advocating environmental concerns, was denied a
permit to solicit when it could not demonstrate that seventy-five percent of
its receipts would be used for charitable purposes. 128
The Court held that the Village of Schaumburg's seventy-five per cent
requirement violated the first amendment. Two important conclusions of
Schaumburg were the Supreme Court's reiteration that commercial speech
enjoys some protection under the first amendment 29 and its statement to
the effect that if there is to be effective and permissible regulation of com-
mercial speech, the component of such speech not deserving of protection-
solicitation of funds-must be identified and separated. As so ably demon-
strated by the facts of Schaumburg, however, it is not easy to separate solic-
Id. at 761 (citations omitted). See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (rejecting the
notion that a publication was unprotected because it was commercial); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding an ordinance which prohibited listing
employment advertisements in such a way that promoted discriminatory hirings even though the
newspaper ads were commercial speech). For an earlier case holding that the act of selling made a
transaction a commercial one and distinguishing Martin v. Struthers, see Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951).
125. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
126. Id. at 623. The Village of Schaumburg (Illinois) adopted an ordinance in 1974 regulating charitable
solicitations and requiring organizations soliciting or intending to solicit from the public to obtain
a permit and to submit an application containing information about the organization, the times
and places of the intended solicitation and whether the organization was tax exempt under the
Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 623-24 & n.3; VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG CODE, art. III, §§ 22-19
to -24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCHAUMBURG CODE].
127. The relevant provision of the Schaumburg Code requires:
Satisfactory proof that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solicitation will
be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization. For such purposes, the fol-
lowing items shall not be deemed to be used for the charitable purposes of the organization,
to wit:
(1) Salaries or commissions paid to solicitors;
(2) Administrative expenses of the organization, including, but not limited to, salaries, at-
torneys' fees, rents, telephone, advertising expenses, contributions to other organizations
and persons, except as a charitable contribution and related expenses incurred as adminis-
trative or overhead items.
SCHAUMBURG CODE, art. III, §§ 22-20(g). See Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of
Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220, 221 n.l (7th Cir. 1978).
128. 444 U.S. at 625.
129. Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable appeals for funds, on the street
or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests-communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are
within the protection of the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly
subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persua-
sive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, polit-
ical, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information
and advocacy would likely cease.
Id. at 632.
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itation of funds from the communication of ideas or positions and
religion-all traditionally protected activity. 3° The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized this conclusion when it indicated that the seventy-
five percent limitation of the ordinance might be enforceable against more
"traditional charitable organizations"' 13 1 or those situations in which the
"solicitors represent themselves as mere conduits for the contributions."' 32
The obvious rationale of the court was that whatever those more "tradi-
tional charitable organizations" might be, 133 their activity did not involve
communicating or advocating an element of religious belief or the commu-
nication of political views or ideas protected by the first amendment. 134
Non-traditional organizations, however, solicit funds from the public, but
combine with their solicitation the "functions of dissemination, discussion,
and advocacy of public issues."' 135 This latter group's activities are deserv-
ing of first amendment protection from the restrictions of overly-broad leg-
islation.' 36 The inability to separate the functions therefore affords
constitutional protection to the solicitation activity.
While the relevant factor in determining whether speech is protected is
the nature and content of the speech activity rather than its characteriza-
tion as commercial or non-commercial, such a distinction is nevertheless
important in determining the permissible scope of regulation within the
context of "times, places and manner" restrictions. The Court noted that
commercial speech, being of a different nature than non-commercial speech,
may be subject to a different degree of protection.' 37 The distinction is also
important in applying the overbreadth doctrine. 38 The difference in the de-
130. See infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Schaumburg.
131. Schaumburg, 590 F.2d at 225-26.
132. Id. at 226.
133. The concept of the more "traditional charitable organization" was not directly defined by the court
of appeals. The Supreme Court indirectly defines non-traditional organizations as those "whose
primary purpose is not to provide money or services for the poor, the needy or other worthy
objects of charity, but to gather and disseminate information about and advocate positions on
matters of public concern." Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635. Conversely, those organizations whose
purposes are to provide money or services to the poor, the needy, or other worthy objects of
charity, and which serve as conduits for contributions, and do not gather and disseminate informa-
tion about and advocate positions on matters of public concern are traditional type organizations
for which the Schaumburg ordinance might be constitutionally applied.
134. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), where the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting solicitors and peddlers from entering private property without permission distinguish-
ing commercial activity from informational activity. Soliciting magazine subscriptions is a com-
mercial activity although the magazines may in fact have matters in them which would be entitled
to first amendment protection. Martin v. Struthers was distinguished.
135. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635 (quoting Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1978)).
136. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, accused the Court of creating a new category of activity and solici-
tors which, when combined with commercial advocacy, is entitled to first amendment protection.
This new category includes organizations "primarily engaged in research, advocacy, or public edu-
cation and that use their own paid staff to carry out their functions as well as to solicit financial
support." Id. at 641-42 (quoting the majority opinion). Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority
in effect invites regulatory agencies to distinguish between matters of public concern and commeri-
cal advocacy, an invitation which conflicts with the Court's ruling in Virginia Pharmacy Board.
Justice Rehnquist observed, "no line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial ad-
vertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn." Id. at 642 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy
Board, 425 U.S. at 764). Objecting further, Rehnquist noted that no guidance was given by the
Court to help the agency make the decision, and discretion left to administering officials is consti-
tutionally impermissible. Id. at 642, 643.
137. 425 U.S. at 770-71, 771 n.24.
138. 444. U.S. at 632 n.7.
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gree of protection afforded and the application of the overbreadth doctrine
are important in the context of charitable solicitation regulation. 39
What then may be gleaned from these cases about the scope of the
"times, places and manner" test established by the Supreme Court? Collec-
tively, the cases recognize that governmental authorities have an interest in
protecting residents from fraud and fraudulent practices, keeping streets
and public ways safe and clean, protecting residents from the annoyance of
intruders or would be burglars, and protecting the health and morals of
residents. The extent to which authorities may enact legislation to achieve
these goals when competing first amendment rights were involved, however,
was the issue in each case. Consequently, if the articulated state concern is
the cleanliness of the streets or public ways, proscribing littering and pun-
ishing those who litter attain that end with little inhibiting affect upon
speech or religious rights. If the articulated concern is to shield residents
from the annoyance of solicitors or the threat of would-be burglars, enact-
ing penalties for violating trespass statutes attain that end with little conse-
quent restriction on the exercise of first amendment rights. If the concern is
preventing fraud or fraudulent activity, the state may make fraud punish-
able. Certain fraudulent activity is readily identifiable and definable and
may, therefore, be proscribed with specificity in the legislation. " While
these types of regulation may not be the most convenient or efficient from
the government's view, neither the Constitution nor the Court's decisions
permit convenience or efficiency to prevail over first amendment rights.
The central theme of the cases, although decided in the context of first
amendment rights, rests upon the resultant constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of laws that are overbroad. Since it is generally ac-
cepted that certain aspects, namely the conduct element of first amendment
rights, may be regulated, each case hinges upon the extent to which the
permissibly regulated conduct also impermissibly regulates the protected
right. Once the conduct to be regulated is identified, the Constitution and
the cases demand that the legislation be tailor-made to regulate that con-
duct with a negligible inhibiting effect upon first amendment rights. More-
over, the cases demand that the legislation have a secular purpose and not
involve a religious test or unduly infringe upon religious freedoms.' 4 ' Fi-
nally, cases require that the administering official be aided in his exercise of
discretion to grant or deny permission to solicit by well-defined legislative
guidelines. In essence, the "times, places, and manner" test reduces itself to
the question of whether the legislation, aimed at permissible governmental
interest, is so far reaching in its operation that its negative effect upon first
amendment rights can not be justified or tolerated. This is especially the
case when other means, if adopted, would achieve the desired result.
139. See, e.g., Munson, 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
140. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
141. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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B. A Continuing Look at Regulation and Specific Problems
1. Subsequent Judicial Decisions
Since deciding these cases, the Supreme Court has had occasion to re-
view legislation involving varying aspects of charitable solicitation.' a In
Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell,'43 the court considered
a municipal ordinance which required advance written notice to the local
police department by "[a]ny person .. desiring to canvass, solicit or call
from house to house for a recognized charitable cause . . . ." ' The pur-
pose of the ordinance on its face was only to identify, prior to any activity,
those groups or persons who would be involved in the solicitation or can-
vassing. If the alleged activity was for a "recognized charitable cause or
political campaign,"' 45 then notice was sufficient. If, however, neither a rec-
ognized charitable cause or a political campaign was involved, the ordi-
nance required the soliciting person to secure a permit. 146
The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the New Jersey court that
the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power. It held the
ordinance vague and said that it vested too much discretion in the police
department. 147 Specifically, the Court held the ordinance in question failed
to meet due process requirements in that "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning."' 48 The ordinance did not in any way
indicate what was a "recognized charitable cause" or "Federal, State,
County or municipal cause."' 4 9 The ordinance also failed to indicate what
must be included in the notification and how such notice was to be given. 50
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring, were concerned that notifi-
cation, which required identification of the person or the organization,
would result in a chilling effect upon first amendment freedoms.' Justice
Brennan wrote that identification requirements impose restrictions on free
speech beyond those permissible by "times, places and manner" restric-
tions.'52 But the Court did not foreclose the possibility that certain ordi-
nances requiring identification might be constitutionally permissible.' 53
Following the landmark decision in Cantwell, the California Supreme
142. Munson, Schaumburg, and Larson are discussed in Section B(2)(a) and (b) of this part, infra.
143. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
144. Id. at 611 n.l.
145. Id. at 613 n.2.
146. Id.
147. Although the appellants argued that the ordinance was overbroad, this case was decided solely on
the basis of vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 620, 621
nn.4-5.
148. Id. at 620 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
149. Id.
150. The Supreme Court was unwilling to accept the lower court's construction that would have per-
mitted compliance with the ordinance by mailing the notification to the police department.
151. Id. at 623.
152. Id.
153. See Justice Brennan's query regarding the validity of Justice Black's observation in Martin v.
Struthers that "[a] city can . . . by identification devices control the abuse of criminals posing as
canvassers." Id. at 628 n.4. Justice Black relies upon a statement in Cantwell: "Without doubt a
State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the commu-
nity, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and
his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent." 319 U.S. at 148, n.14 (citing
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306). Compare to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (where the Court
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Court held a Los Angeles solicitation ordinance valid in Gospel Army v. City
of Los Angeles'5 4 and Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of the City of Los
Angeles."' In Gospel Army, the ordinance required any person who solic-
ited funds for charity to file a notice of intent to solicit with the regulatory
agency 56 containing certain required information'57 and to receive from
the agency an information card containing information deemed to "be of
assistance to the public in determining the nature and worthiness of the
solicitation."'5 8 The card was issued automatically upon filing the required
information and the payment of four cents per card.' 59 The ordinance re-
quired the solicitor to show the information card to prospective donors and
to make no misstatements about the solicitation. 60 The solicitor also had to
carry written authorization from the organization represented.
A promoter was required to submit an application for a license which
indicated his qualifications and showed that he was of good character and
reputation. 161 The regulatory agency granted the license if it was satisfied
that the applicant was of good character and reputation, had financial re-
sponsibility incident to the proposed solicitation, and intended to conduct
his business as promoter fairly and honestly.' 62
Solicitations from organizational members and upon premises owned or
occupied by the organization were exempt from the regulatory provisions.
The same was true for solicitations for religious purposes. Plaintiff in Gospel
Army claimed an exemption as a religious organization, arguing that char-
ity was part of its religious duties and that to regulate solicitations for char-
ity would abridge its constitutional rights. 163 Recognizing that charity,
while viewed as a religious duty by many, is not exclusively a religious ac-
tivity, the Court held the organization subject to the ordinance.' 64
A second question raised in Gospel Army was the validity of the provi-
sion in the ordinance which permitted the regulatory agency to deny a li-
cense if the promoter was not of good character and reputation. The court
upheld this provision, finding that it neither discriminated against plaintiff,
upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act which required disclosure prior to soliciting campaign
contributions). See also supra note 119.
154. 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945), appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 543 (1947).
155. 28 Cal. 2d 460, 171 P.2d 8 (1946), appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). In Rescue Army the
California Supreme Court had before it Gospel Army but did not decide the ultimate issue regard-
ing the constitutionality of the Los Angeles ordinances noting that the precise question had neither
been decided nor properly established in the state court proceeding.
156. 27 Cal. 2d at 237, 238, 163 P.2d at 708 n.1; 28 Cal. 2d at 468, 171 P.2d at 13, 14 n.1.
157. Id.
158. 27 Cal. 2d at 237-41, 163 P.2d. at 708-10; 28 Cal. 2d at 468-69, 171 P.2d at 13, 14.
159. 27 Cal. 2d at 238-39, 163 P.2d at 709; 28 Cal. 2d at 470-71, 171 P.2d at 15.
160. 27 Cal. 2d at 239, 163 P.2d at 709; 28 Cal. 2d at 468-69, 171 P.2d at 13, 14.
161. 27 Cal. 2d at 241, 163 P.2d at 710.
162. 27 Cal. 2d at 242, 163 P.2d at 710.
163. Id.
164. 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704. The court distinguished Cantwell by noting that in Cantwell funds
were solicited for the organization, Jehovah's Witnesses, and not for charitable purposes, and the
regulatory agency had the right to determine if the organization was a religious one. In Gospel
Army, the court determined that since the ordinance regulated charitable activity without a reli-
gious test, the same was permissible. The court and the statute drew a distinction between solicit-
ing solely for religious purposes by a religious organization and soliciting for charitable purposes
by a religious organization. In the former the organization was exempt from the ordinance's
requirement.
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religion or religious beliefs, nor delegated arbitrary authority to the agency.
The court noted that such requirements were common in regulating admis-
sion to professions and occupations. 65
In Rescue Army, the California Supreme Court again considered the Los
Angeles ordinance,' 66 specifically considering the validity of a provision
which required persons soliciting charitable contributions though use of re-
ceptacles placed in specified publicly owned or controlled places to obtain
prior written permission from a regulatory agency.' 67 The court found that
solicitations by receptacles differed from face-to-face solicitations because
persons solicited by these means had no opportunity to determine if the
solicitation was fraudulent.' 68 In the face-to-face solicitation, the solicitor is
required to present to each person a card containing certain information,
thus allowing potential donors to determine for themselves the validity of
the cause. For this reason, the court held that the agency could deny per-
mission to solicit by receptacle if it found fraud on the solicitor's informa-
tion card, although it could not in the first place have refused to issue the
card. 69
Hynes, Gospel Army, and Rescue Army, while reiterating many of the
limitations previously outlined under the "times, places and manner" test,
adds an additional limitation to our analysis-a due process proscription
against legislation that is vague.17 0 At the same time these cases indicate
that requiring solicitors to identify themselves and to disclose specified in-
formation to potential donors lies within the permissible limits of the "time,
places and manner" test. Rescue Army further demonstrates that as the
methods for soliciting increase the risk of harm to the public, the authorities
165. 27 Cal. 2d at 248, 163 P.2d at 714. Cantwell was again distinguished in that the ordinance there
permitted a determination of what was a religious cause or an object of charity or philanthropy.
The ordinance in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), which permitted the regulatory agency
to determine the good character of an applicant prior to the granting of a solicitation permit, was
distinguished. The business of promoting and soliciting for compensation when one is not a mem-
ber of the organization is a business, a profession, which can be legitimately licensed and regulated.
166. The court reaffirmed its prior holding that the first amendment freedom to believe did not include
the freedom to act. Since charity and charitable activity could be distinguished from matters purely
religious in character, the former could be regulated even if carried on by a religious organization.
Additionally, the court reiterated the validity of the requirement that solicitors be required to
exhibit an information card.
167. 28 Cal. 2d at 469-70, 171 P.2d at 14 n.4.
168. 171 P.2d at 15-16.
169. This was the court's interpretation of the ordinance. A less abusive way to protect the public from
fraud would be to require a similar information card to be conspicuously placed appropriately on
the receptacle so that it would be in plain view. Placed in such a manner, a potential donor has the
same information that a donor solicited in a face-to-face transaction would have, assuming that the
information was presented to the donor and no questions were asked. This method is not entirely
satisfactory since the opportunity to ask for additional information in a face-to-face transaction
would not be available.
As in Gospel Army, Cantwell was distinguished. The Los Angeles ordinance did not permit the
agency to determine whether a cause was a religious one and therefore did not affect religious
freedoms. If the solicitation by receptacle was for a charitable purpose, then compliance with the
ordinance was required.
170. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.
1979) and International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263 (7th
Cir. 1978) (discussing the vagueness issue in the context of legislation regulating charitable solicita-
tion at airports). See also People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1983) (holding the phrase "'primar-
ily for the benefit" as used in an earlier Colorado statute unconstitutionally vague and violative of
due process). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-115 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
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have greater flexibility in regulating the same. Requiring charitable organi-
zations to register prior to soliciting, even though registration is in effect an
identification, is also permissible within the limits of the test. Finally, au-
thorities have a greater ability to constitutionally regulate professional fund
raisers and solicitors since they are engaged in a commercial business
endeavor.
2. Specific Problems
a. Regulation of Fund Raising Costs
One major concern of states and municipalities is the diversion of sub-
stantial sums of solicited dollars from the charitable purposes of the solicit-
ing organizations. This concern results in part from funds being diverted
contractually to professional fund raisers and solicitors.1 7 , Several munici-
palities and states have attempted to control such activity by imposing limi-
tations upon the compensation which a fund raiser may charge or a
charitable organization may pay to a fund raiser, or by imposing limitations
upon fundraising or administrative expenses of the organization.' 72 These
enactments have drawn the fire of constitutional challenges as well as criti-
cism by members of the fund-raising industry. 73
In National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth,' 74 an ordinance 7 1 limit-
ing the cost of soliciting for charitable contributions to twenty percent with-
stood a due process and first amendment attack. After holding that the city
could reasonably require the soliciting organization to provide information
regarding past and expected receipts and costs of soliciting funds, the Fifth
Circuit held that the city could also "deny permission to solicit if the cost of
collection was excessive."1 76 The court, however, warned that "a fixed per-
centage limitation on the costs of solicitation might be undesirable and in-
applicable if applied to all types of charitable organizations. What may be
proper in one situation may not be so in other situations."'' 77 The court did
not expand upon this statement except to recognize that the ordinance did
171. See William J. Brown v. Hamilton Productions, Case No. 78-CV-12-5812 (C.P. Franklin County,
Ohio, October 13, 1981) (of $31,694 contributed by the public generally, only about $4,000, 12.6%
of gross receipts, were received by the charitable organization involved); William J. Brown v. R. E.
Holloway, Case No. CA 6689 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio, July 15, 1981) (challenging
the receipt by a fireman's organization of $6,120, 11.6% of gross receipts totalling more than
$53,000). See also People ex rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, 60 111. App. 3d 331, 376 N.E.2d 665
(1978).
172. See supra Part I, Section D.
173. See discussion in Part III, Sections D & E.
174. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 1040 (1970).
175. Following receipt of an application for a solicitation permit and any investigation necessary, the
commission was to certify to the city secretary its approval to issue a permit if the ordinance had
been complied with in all respects and none of the following conditions existed:
(f) That the cost of solicitation for a charitable purpose in the city during any of the
three years immediately preceding the date of application has been excessive in relation to
the gross amount raised.
(g) That the expected cost of solicitation will be excessive in relation to the expected
gross amount to be raised. Any such cost in excess of twenty per cent of the amount col-
lected shall be deemed to be unreasonable unless special facts or circumstances are
presented showing that a cost higher than twenty per cent is not unreasonable.
Id. at 43 n.2.
176. Id. at 46.
177. Id.
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not create a fixed percentage.17 In each case a "determination of the rea-
sonableness of the ratio between the cost of solicitation and the amount
collected" ' 79 was to be made. The twenty percent provided in the ordinance
created a threshold above which the solicitor must show that any higher
ratio was not unreasonable. 8 0
Enactments such as that in National Foundation have also been attacked
as arbitrary, vague, and lacking in definite and ascertainable standards.181
The use of the term "excessive" was held not to be vague when read in pari
materia with the twenty percent limitation in the Fort Worth ordinance.
182
Similarly, the words "legitimate and reasonable" used in a statute which
required at least seventy-five percent of gross receipts to be used for charita-
ble purposes were held to be terms which persons of common intelligence
could understand. 183 Construing these words in pari materia, the court held
that they further "clarify the meaning of gross receipts and afford sufficient
notice to those designated by the statute as specifically within its
purview."' 84
The United States Supreme Court first spoke to the issue of percentage
limitations on charitable solicitation cost in Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment, 8 5 where the ordinance required that applica-
tions for permits contain "satisfactory proof that at least seventy-five
percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the
charitable purposes of the organization."' 86 The ordinance specifically pro-
vided that salaries or commissions paid to solicitors and administrative ex-
penses of the organization were not to be considered use of funds for
charitable purposes. 17
Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a not-for-profit corporation
organized to promote environmental protection, was denied a charitable so-
licitation permit because it could not demonstrate that seventy-five percent
of its receipts would be used for charitable purposes as required by the ordi-
nance.' 8 CBE employed canvassers to engage in door-to-door activity,
which included distributing literature on environmental topics, answering
questions, soliciting contributions for financial support, and receiving griev-
ances and complaints from residents.' 89 The court of appeals found the or-
dinance unreasonable on its face "when applied to an organization which by
its nature allegedly devotes a large portion of its efforts to gathering infor-
mation and promotion of its objectives, and where its paid solicitors neces-
178. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
179. 415 F.2d at 46.
180. Id.
181. See National Foundation, 415 F.2d 41; People ex rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, 60 11. App. 3d
331, 376 N.E.2d 665 (1978).
182. 415 F.2d at 47.
183. People ex. rel. Scott v. Police Hall of Fame, 60 Ill. App. 3d 331, 376 N.E.2d 665 (1978).
184. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 376 N.E.2d at 673.
185. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
186. See supra note 127.
187. Id. "Administrative expenses" included but were not limited to salaries, attorneys' fees, rents,
telephone expenses, advertising expenses, contributions to other organizations and persons, except
as a charitable contribution and related expenses incurred as administrative or overhead items. Id.
188. 444 U.S. at 625.
189. Id.
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sarily combine solicitation with other primary activities of the
organization."' 9 ° The court of appeals distinguished "the traditional con-
cept of charitable organizations" and organizations like CBE "which serve
• . .information gathering and dissemination function[s]" as well as work-
ing routinely to "promote legislation or other government action."'' Often
the paid solicitors in the latter group perform the primary functions of the
organization, that is, "dissemination, discussion, and advocacy of public is-
sues." 192 For these types of organizations, the court of appeals believed that
the seventy-five percent requirement unconstitutionally infringed upon first
amendment rights.' 93 Notwithstanding the legitimate interest of the city in
protecting its citizens from fraud, as well as identifying organizations whose
administrative and fund raising costs are so high, that "the organization is
actually a for profit venture,"' 94 the ordinance in question was not narrowly
drawn to obtain those legitimate ends without unduly imposing on pro-
tected freedoms.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals in that the seventy-
five percent limitation had a direct and substantial effect upon protected
activity which could not be sustained for the reasons provided by the vil-
lage.' 95 It does not follow that an organization which expends more than
twenty-five percent of solicited funds for administraive costs is a commer-
cial for profit organization rather than a charitable organization. As the
court of appeals recognized and the Supreme Court affirmed, organizations
like CBE that engage in the dissemination of information with their paid
staff, and other types of research, advocacy, or public education organiza-
tions who use their own paid staff to perform the organization's functions,
as well as to solicit funds for support, are no less charitable in nature than
"traditional" charities, simply because their fund-raising expenses exceed
certain limits.' 96 The ordinance lumped all organizations whose fund rais-
ing costs exceeded an established maximum together without considering
the nature of the organization or its activities.' 97
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that "a simple request for money
lies far from the core protections of the First Amendment."' 98 This state-
ment fails to consider the situation where the solicitation is tied to informa-
tion gathering and dissemination, and therefore not just a simple request for
money. It is not an easy task to separate the two functions-requesting
charitable donations and providing or gathering information.' 99 A determi-
190. 590 F.2d at 225.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The appeals court, as has the Supreme Court, expressly left open the question of whether such a
percentage requirement would be constitutionally permissible for the more traditional oranization.
194. Id. at 226.
195. 444 U.S. at 636.
196. Id. at 636-37.
197. The 25% limitation also failed to regulate in a less intrusive way legitimate concerns of the city or,
in some cases, to even relate to those concerns. The Court noted those interests to be prevention of
fraud, public safety and residential privacy. Id. at 636, 638-39. Nowhere is the state's interest in
encouraging efficient acquisition and utilization of charitable dollars discussed.
198. Id. at 644. See also supra note 136.
199. For example, veterans organizations, as part of their public education programs, disseminate infor-
mation in the mail and at the same time request funds to promote their programs, one of which is
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nation of what constitutes fund-raising costs, administrative costs, and pro-
gram costs is often not easily or nicely made. Consequently, legislation like
that in Schaumburg would seriously affect the fund raising and program
activites of such an organization. Public education and the dissemination of
information, protected rights, would also be seriously affected by an ordi-
nance or statute absolute in its operation. 2°
An important question left unanswered by the Supreme Court's decision
in Schaumburg is whether a statute is constitutional if it prescribed a per-
centage limitation on charitable solicitation fund raising cost, but permitted
exceptions based on specific guidelines contained in a statute and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to statute.20 ' The question was answered
negatively in Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc. v. Secretary of State of
Maryland.2 °2
Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc., a professional fund raiser, brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of a Maryland statute which pro-
hibited charitable organizations from paying or agreeing to pay as expenses
for fund raising more than twenty-five percent of the gross receipts.20 3 Pur-
suant to statute, the Secretary of State was directed to promulgate regula-
tions permitting a charitable organization to pay or agree to pay more than
twenty-five percent of its gross income as expenses if the percentage limita-
tion would "effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising
contributions. ' °2 ' The Court of Appeals of Maryland,2 0 5 reversing the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, held the statute unconstitutional as
an impermissible infringement on free speech, relying principally upon the
Supreme Court's opinion in Schaumburg.2 °6
In affirming the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme
public education on the problems of veterans. The same may be said about an organization trying
to educate the public about diseases while soliciting funds for continuing research.
200. Justice Rehnquist interestingly pointed out that the ordinance did not grant to municipal authori-
ties discretion in the granting or denying of licenses to solicit. If the prior year's solicitation ex-
penses exceeded the 25% limit, the organization was precluded from soliciting. He suggested that
the seemingly approving reference by the majority of the Court to the ordinance considered in
National Foundation would permit a municipal authority to exercise discretion by allowing appli-
cants to show that costs of solicitation are not unreasonable. He noted that earlier Supreme Court
rulings invalidated legislation which granted such unfettered discretion. See supra note 136. Justice
Rehnquist's concern that there may be actual or a potential for abuse of discretion could be sub-
stantially guarded against by the promulgation of regulations by a governmental agency pursuant
to articulated legislative standards. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (where suggested
guidelines are provided) and Appendix F. Abuse of discretion cases like Cantwell found that few
or no guidelines for exercising discretion were provided to the agency. Once regulations are
promulgated which are indeed neutral and legitimate, bearing a reasonable relationship to legiti-
mate governmental interest, any abuse or potential for abuse should be challenged on their
application.
201. This question arises as a result of the Supreme Court's reference to the ordinance in National
Foundation and the Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish between charitable organizations
which include advocacy and dissemination of information as part of their solicitation and charita-
ble organizations of the more "traditional" type. In making this distinction, the Court voided the
ordinance because its absolute application to all types of organizations failed to consider important
factors which might necessitate higher fees. Failure to consider these factors penalized some orga-
nizations in the exercise of first amendment rights.
202. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984), aff'g 294 Md. 160, 448 A.2d 935 (1982).
203. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D (1957).
204. Id.
205. The Maryland Court of Appeals is the state's highest court.
206. 294 Md. at 173-82, 448 A.2d at 942-47.
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Court rejected the Secretary's argument that the Maryland statute signifi-
cantly differed from the ordinance considered in Schaumburg in that the
statute did not involve a prior restraint.2" 7 The Supreme Court agreed with
the Maryland Court's determination that the statute was a more sweeping
prior restraint than the Schaumburg ordinance.208 The Court also rejected
the Secretary's second argument that the statute differed from the ordi-
nance because the statute provided an administrative waiver to the opera-
tion of the percentage limitation. Since the Secretary was directed to
promulgate regulations that would allow organizations to agree to pay more
than twenty-five percent of gross income to professional fund raisers if not
to do so would "effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising
contributions,"209 she argued that the statute was more flexible, thereby
minimizing any encroachment of first amendment rights.2"' The Maryland
Court of Appeals found this waiver to be extremely narrow, however, fo-
cusing only on organizations that might be prevented from collecting funds
because of the limitation.2" The waiver did not address the concern of
Schaumburg that organizations engaging in public education, dissemination
of information, or advocacy of public issues remain barred by statute,
thereby unduly infringing their first amendment freedoms.212 In the opinion
of the majority of the Supreme Court, the provision did not relate directly
to the state's interest in preventing fraud or mismanagement.
2
,
3
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Schaumburg, also dissented in Munson
and was joined by three other Justices. 2 4 Essentially, he wrote that applica-
tion of the overbreadth doctrine was inappropriate in this case and that the
Maryland statute was markedly different from the Schaumburg ordi-
207. 294 Md. at 176, 448 A.2d at 944.
208. The court of appeals noted that the statute required all charitable organizations or professional
fund raisers engaging in any solicitation activity to submit an application whether they were solicit-
ing door-to-door, on the streets, or in any other manner. The Schaumburg ordinance only per-
tained to solicitations door-to-door or on public streets. Continuing, the court noted that approval
of the professional fund raiser's registration was required prior to any solicitation, every contract
between a professional fund raiser and organization had to be submitted to the Secretary and
approved if the promised compensation exceeded the percentage limitation, and the Secretary
could cancel a registration if the organization or fund raiser violated any provison of the statute.
294 Md. at 176-79, 448 A.2d at 944-45. See also 104 S. Ct. at 2853-54. The four dissenting Supreme
Court Justices opined that the statute differed from the Schaumburg ordinance and further charac-
terized the statute as being "primarily directed at controlling the external, economic relations be-
tween charities and professional fund raisers." 104 S. Ct. at 2859. See infra notes 215-18 and
accompanying text for additional distinctions made by dissent.
209. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D
210. 294 Md. at 180, 448 A.2d at 946.
211. Id.
212. 104 S. Ct. 2850.
213. Id. at 2852.
The majority writes: The state legislature's announced purpose in enacting the 1976
revision of the charitable organization provisions . . . was to "assure that contributions will
be used to benefit the intended purpose." [citation omitted] The State's justification there-
fore may be read as an interest in preventing mismanagement as well as fraud. The flaw in
the statute, however, remains. The percentage limitation is too imprecise a tool to achieve
that purpose.
Id. at 2852 n.14 (emphasis added).
214. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. In
Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenting justice. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell had joined in the majority decision in Schaumburg while Justice O'Connor was not on the
Court at that time.
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nance. 2I" Rehnquist characterized the statute "as an economic regulation
setting a limit on the fees charged by professional fund raisers," ' 6 which
was not "directed at controlling the nature and internal working of charita-
ble organizations seeking to solicit in the Village. ' 21 7 Munson and other
professional fund raisers were not engaged in speech activities in the eyes of
the dissent and the statute merely controlled the fees the licensed firm was
permitted to charge.218
The dissent identified as a legitimate and substantial governmental inter-
est the regulation of not only fraud as defined in common law, but also
fraud as found in excessive costs of charitable solicitation when such costs
have not been fully disclosed to both the contributor and the charity. Chari-
ties are protected "from being overcharged by unscrupulous professional
fund raisers. ' ' 219 In the opinion of the dissent, "[r]ates charged by profes-
sional fund raisers are . . . easily identifiable [and] constitutionally
prosecutable.' ' 220 Furthermore, even though solicitation expenses other
than those spent on professional fund raisers were regulated, the dissent
believed the statute continued to serve the "legitimate objectives of regulat-
ing fund raising costs not attributable to public education or advocacy."
22 1
The Maryland statute had several faults which may have led the Mary-
land Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court to conclude that the statute
was not better than the ordinance in Schaumburg. First, the legislature, and
consequently the statute, failed to provide guidelines to the Secretary in the
promulgation of regulations.222 One of the regulations promulgated in-
cluded costs associated with advocacy and public education as well as fund-
raising expenses.223 The failure to specifically provide for an allocation
formula to separate fund-raising costs from informational dissemination
costs strikes a dissonant chord with protected first amendment rights. 24 On
its face, the statute also limited the application of the waiver provision to
organizations that would be prohibited from raising funds by the operation
215. The dissent noted the following distinctions between the Maryland statute and the Schaumburg
ordinance: (1) administrative and overhead costs of the charitable organization were not included
as fund raising costs; (2) many costs associated with solicitations were excluded from the definition
of fund raising cost; (3) the statute allowed for an administrative waiver from the operation of the
25% limitation which was sufficient to protect unpopular charities; (4) acutal cost and the alloca-
tion of expenses were to be reported in accordance with the standard of accounting and fiscal
reporting for voluntary health and welfare organizations; the statute seemed to require a pro rata
allocation of expenses between fund raising activity and advocacy or information dissemination;
and (5) the statute excluded from the definition of professional fund raiser bona fide salaried of-
ficers or employees of the charitable organization. Id. at 2860-62.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The dissent compared the Maryland statute to a regulation governing the fees charged by
employment agencies, citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978), and
William v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 438 (1955).
219. "The concern is not that someone may abscond to South America with the funds collected.
Rather, a high fund-raising fee itself betrays the expectations of the donor who thinks that his
money will be used to benefit the charitable purpose in the name of which the money was solic-
ited." Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2860 n.2.
220. Id. at 2860.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 2851 n.12.
223. 104 S. Ct. at 2850, 2851 nn.lI, 12.
224. The dissent noted that this regulation may not be consistent with the statute. Id. at 2862 n.5.
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of the statute, but provided no relief for organizations that would be prohib-
ited from raising funds although their fund-raising expenses, while exceed-
ing the limit, were nevertheless reasonable. These faults, in and of
themselves, may be sufficient to void the statute.
But, even if the discretion to grant exemptions from the statute was
broad, yet well-defined, and even if the statute and regulations contained
allocation formulas with respect to different kinds of expenses, the Supreme
Court still concluded that requiring a "license for the dissemination of ideas
is inherently suspect. ' 225 Moreover, the Court stated that preventing the
mismanagement of solicited dollars with a statute like Maryland's could not
withstand the constitutional challenge that it was too imprecisely drawn.2 26
In this regard the court extends the "times, places and manner" test beyond
the principles established in the line of cases discussed earlier. The Court
dismissed the state's interest in promoting and regulating efficient acquisi-
tion and utilization of charitable dollars with a statute that does not pre-
sume that high fund-raising costs equal fraud, but that high costs may, in
fact, mean unreasonable, excessive, and inefficient fund raising, as well as
signaling the presence of an unscrupulous fund raiser, professional or other-
wise. This is the real distinction between the Maryland statute, even with its
shortcomings, and the Schaumburg ordinance. Because of the faults in the
Maryland statute, a question remains whether a better drafted statute can
withstand a constituional challenge. Munson does not appear to foreclose
such a statute, notwithstanding the Court's dicta regarding the efficacy of
fund-raising percentages. Such a statute is proposed in Part III.
b. Exemption From Compliance-Religious Organizations
As previously noted in Part I, states exempt some organizations from
compliance with statutory registration requirements for many reasons. One
type of exemption-one based on the extent to which funds are received
from individuals who are not members of the organization-has recently
been challenged as violative of the first amendment establishment clause
and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.22 7 In Heritage Vil-
lage Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State,2 28 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held unconstituional a North Carolina statute, which ex-
empted religious organizations from the licensing requirement,229 provided
that the organization's financial support was derived primarily from contri-
butions solicited from its members. In addition to the religious exemption,
the statute exempted organizations soliciting only within their member-
225. Id. at 2850 n.12.
226. See supra note 213.
227. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc.
v. State, 290 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726, aff'g 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1980). See also
National Foundation (denial of equal protection challenge of a city ordinance which exempted
from the regulatory requirements religious organizations which solicit funds for its own use and
solely from its own members, as well as fraternal, social, patriotic, cultural and educational organi-
zations soliciting from their own membership (discussed supra notes 174-82 and accompanying
text)).
228. 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726, aff'g 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1980).
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(1) (1978).
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ship.23 ° Other exemptions were provided, but were not predicated upon the
extent to which funds were collected from members or non-members.2 3' In
effect, the exemption drew a distinction between religious organizations that
received most of their support outside of its membership and those that did
not. Non-traditional religious organizations-those that receive most of
their funds by soliciting the public-must satisfy the requirements while
traditional religious organizations-those that use the collection plate--es-
cape the burdens of registering. No similar distinction was made for non-
religious organizations.
The purpose of the statute, as stated therein, was to protect the general
public by requiring full disclosure of facts about the persons and organiza-
tions soliciting and the purposes for which the solicited funds would be
used.2 32 The North Carolina Supreme Court determined, based upon the
purpose clause and the exemption scheme, that the legislature believed or-
ganizations soliciting within their own membership, using non-paid mem-
bers as solicitors or reporting regularly to its membership posed less risk of
harm to the general public than organizations not meeting one or more of
those conditions.2 33 In striking down the statute, North Carolina's court of
appeals and its supreme court rejected the underlying assumption that
funds solicited primarily within the organization would not be raised or
used in a fraudulent manner, whereas funds solicited primarily outside the
organization would be subject to fraud.23 4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court also rejected the notion that the membership would keep closer tabs
on organizational officials, thereby building in a regulatory safeguard not
found in organizations soliciting primarily outside their memberships.23
In Larson v. Valente,236 the Supreme Court held a Minnesota statute,
similar to the North Carolina statute, unconstitutional as violative of the
establishment clause of the first amendment.2 37 The statute exempted reli-
gious organizations from registering if more than half of their contributions
were received from members, a parent or affiliated organization, or a combi-
nation of the two.2 38 Appellants, the Minnesota Attorney General and the
Commisioner of Securities, argued that absent the safeguard of membership
230. Id. § 108-75.7(a)(5).
231. An exemption was provided for veterans organizations; volunteer firemen, ambulance and rescue
squads; and fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, and associations under a lodge system so long as
the fund-raising activity was conducted by the members without compensation. Id. § 108-
75.7(a)(7). Non-profit community clubs and civic groups meeting specified conditions were also
exempt if all funds collected, less reasonable expenses, were distributed at the direction of the
board of directors; and full reports were given to the membership at least once a year. Id. § 108-
75(a)(8) (1978).
232. Id. § 108-75.2 (1978).
233. 299 N.C. at 411-12, 263 S.E.2d at 733.
234. The court of appeals noted that a religious organization which solicits in excess of $2,000 primarily
from non-members, the total of which exceeds 50% of all solicitations, is required to acquire a
license, while a larger religious organization could solicit $1,000,000 and not be required to get a
license if 50% of the contributions came from its membership. 40 N.C. App. at 448, 253 S.E.2d at
484. See also 299 N.C. at 411, 412, 263 S.E.2d at 733 (opinion of the North Carolina Supreme
Court).
235. 299 N.C. at 412, 253 S.E.2d at 733.
236. 456 U.S. 228.
237. 456 U.S. at 255.
238. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.515-1(6) (1978).
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funding, there was an obvious need for public disclosure.23 9 They urged that
members have significant control over the solicitation and expenditure of
contributions collected from themselves by their organizations, a situation
not existing when funds come primarily from non-members.
The Court identified and rejected, summarily, three underlying premises
of the appellants' argument: (1) "that members of a religious organization
can and will exercise supervision and control over the organization's solici-
tations" when the membership contributes more than fifty percent of the
funds; (2) "that membership control . . . is an adequate safeguard against
abusive solicitations of the public;" and (3) "that the need for public disclo-
sure rises in proportion with the percentage of non-member contribu-
tions. ' ' 2 ' The Court was of the opinion that although the premises might be
correct in some cases, it did not believe the correctness of the premises
could be demonstrated as a general proposition. With respect to the first
premise, appellants failed to provide evidence supporting the proposition
that members of religious organizations would in fact supervise and control
effectively their organizations simply because they contribute more than
half of its financial support.241 The second premise was contrary to the
"central thesis" of the entire statutory scheme which assumed that "chari-
table organizations soliciting from the public cannot be relied upon to regu-
late themselves, ' 24 2 thereby necessitating state regulation. With respect to
the third premise, the Court believed that the need for public disclosure was
more directly related to the amount of funds raised from the public rather
than the percentage raised from non-member contributions.2 4 3
The statutes in Heritage and Larson presented an additional problem.
Both statutes applied only to religious organizations, the effect of which was
to exempt some religious organizations from the burdens of the ordinance
while requiring other religious organizations to comply. Less traditional
religious organizations, that is, those which gained their support outside of
their membership as compared to the traditional collection plate, were re-
quired to meet the requirements of the statutes. Such a disparate and dis-
239. Where the safeguards of membership funding do not exist, the need for public disclosure is
obvious ....
As public contributions increase as a percentage of total contributions, the need for pub-
lic disclosure increases . . . . The particular point at which public disclosure should be re-
quired . . is a determination for the legislature . . . . [T]he Act's "majority" distinction is
a compelling point, since it is at this point that the organization becomes predominantly
public funded.
456 U.S. at 248.
240. Id. at 248-49.
241. Id. at 249.
242. Id. at 250. See also id. at 243 n.26.
243. The Supreme Court constructed a hypothetical. Church A raises $10 million, 20% from non-
members. Church B raises $50,000, 60% from non-members. The third premise provides that with
respect to the $2 million raised by church A there is a lesser need for public disclosure than with
respect to the $30,000 raised by church B. The distinction being based solely on the percentage of
non-membership contribution. The Supreme Court observed that the need for disclosure rises di-
rectly in proportion to the total amount of non-member contributions. Obviously, there is more
concern for the $2 million raised simply because of the amount. More importantly, however, the
very enactment of solicitation regulations strongly indicates that there is a concern for fraudulent
solicitation, misuse, and misappropriation of charitable dollars where such has been solicited from
the general public.
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criminatory result among religious organizations could not withstand the
secular neutrality toward religion required under the establishment clause
of the first amendment. 2"
If a statute is to withstand an establishment clause attack, it must satisfy
the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman:245 1) the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; 2) its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) the statute must not fos-
ter an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 246 Neither the
North Carolina or Minnesota statutes could satisfy all three prongs of the
Lemon test. Although the North Carolina statute was found to have a
valid secular purpose, it could not satisfy the second prong of the test.
The exemption scheme and its disparate effect among religious organiza-
tions advanced the cause of orthodox religions while inhibiting the cause of
evangelical religions. 248 The North Carolina Supreme Court determined
that the statute also fostered excessive governmental entanglement with
religion in conflict with the third prong of the test. 249 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the Minnesota statute transgressed the
first two prongs of the test.25 ° Relying principally on the third prong of the
test as articulated in Walz v. Tax Commissioner,25 t the United States
Supreme Court stated that the Minnesota statute "engendered a risk of
politicizing religion .. ,252 The legislative history of the Minnesota stat-
ute lent a great deal of support to the Court's fear that politicization of
religion would occur.253
Problematic in both Heritage and Larson was the apparent lack of evi-
dence offered to substantiate a claim that an exemption based on the per-
centage of membership versus non-membership solicitation has merit. Both
courts attacked the underlying assumptions as if no proof could be offered
to support the rationality of the exemption. An issue is, therefore, raised as
to whether there exists a plausible and rational basis for granting an exemp-
244. It is not the purpose of this article to explore problems of religious solicitation regulation. Only a
brief mention of the specific problem is included here. See generally Rakay & Sugarman, A Recon-
sideration of the Religion Exemption: The Need for Financial Disclosure of Religious Fund Raising
and Solicitation Practices, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 863 (1978).
245. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also the Supreme Court's requirement of religious neutrality set forth in
Cantwell (discussed supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text).
246. Id. at 612-13.
247. 299 N.C. at 408, 263 S.E.2d at 731.
248. 299 N.C. at 410-14, 263 S.E.2d at 732-35.
249. 299 N.C. at 414-16, 263 S.E.2d at 735-36.
250. 637 F.2d 562, 567-69 (8th Cir. 1981).
251. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
[G]overnmental involvement in programs concerning religion "may be so direct or in such
degree as to engender a risk of politicizing religion . . . . (R]eligious groups inevitably
represent certain points of view and not infrequently assert them in the political arena, as
evidenced by the continuing debate respecting birth control and abortion laws. Yet history
cautions that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against ....
[G]overnment participation in certain programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the
state in details of administration and planning, may escalate to the point of inviting undue
fragmentation."
456 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 695).
252. 456 U.S. at 253.
253. The Minnesota legislative history and debate revealed an intent to specifically regulate religious
organizations who solicit on the street, such as members of Reverend Moon's Unification Church.
Id. at 254-55.
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tion to one organization and not another based upon the source of the solic-
ited funds to the organizations. If, as has been suggested, the state's interest
is in protecting the general public from fraud and abuses associated with
solicitations, the state has little interest in regulating organizations when
the solicitation is confined to the organization's members.254 This does not
mean that the state has no interest or that it may not institute investigations
or take action where it learns of fraud in such organizations. It also does
not mean that there is no fraud or abuse present. What it does mean, how-
ever, is that given the opportunity to allocate limited resources, the state
will most likely focus on public solicitations and the larger ones at that.
Where membership is defined to exclude those who become members as a
result of the contribution, an organization cannot convert an otherwise pub-
lic solicitation into a membership solicitation.
The issue becomes more complicated when considering where the line is
to be drawn in determining the point at which the state is willing to become
actively involved in regulating certain soliciting organizations through a
formalized monitoring process. As the percentage of non-organizational
members targeted by or contributors to fund-raising campaigns increase,
the more public255 the solicitation becomes. The level of the state's interest
in regulating solicitation activity is directly related to that percentage. Simi-
larly, as the percentage of the organization's funds coming from non-mem-
bers increases, the public becomes more involved in the financial support of
the organization and the solicitation is consequently more public. The
state's interest under such circumstances is correspondingly heightened.
Although the state's interest in regulating solicitation is also dependent on
the actual amount of funds collected from the public and not just the per-
centage relationship of those funds to funds attributable to member contri-
butions, this is only one additional factor to be considered. This factor need
not be the predominant factor that the state considers in drafting legislative
exemptions from the registration process. The Supreme Court in Larson
effectively makes the amount of funds received from non-members the pre-
dominant factor to be considered by the state in drafting an exemption
based on membership versus non-membership solicitation.256
A number of exemptive provisions may be drafted which consider one
or more of the factors previously listed. One type of provision might grant
an exemption so long as the solicitation is confined to the membership.
Under this type of provision, a soliciting organization is required to register
and file periodic reports if one non-member is the target of a solicitation
campaign. A variation on this provision might look to the number of non-
members solicited. Another provision might grant an exemption to small
solicitations. Under such a provision, if an organization expects to exceed or
does exceed the statutorily prescribed amount, the exemption is not avail-
able. An exemptive provision might look solely to the actual amount of
funds received from non-members as a variation to the small solicitation
254. See National Foundation, 415 F.2d at 48.
255. See supra note 54.
256. See supra note 243.
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exemption. Under this type of provision, the state would be saying that if
the organization does not expect to receive or does not receive more than
$15,000 (hypothetically) from non-members, then it is exempted from the
registration and reporting requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court
considered this possibility in Larson v. Valente but refused to comment on
whether such a provision would survive a constitutional challenge under
the facts of that case.2 57 An exemptive provision might be drafted which
looks to the percentage of financial support provided by non-members (the
Minnesota and North Carolina approach). Another set of approaches might
include some combination of the previously mentioned provisions. For ex-
ample, an exemption might be provided if financial support is expected to
come or is actually received from individuals, more than seventy percent
(hypothetically) of whom are members, but the exemption is lost if the
amount of funds contributed by non-members exceeds $15,000 (hypotheti-
cally). A combination approach might grant an exemption if seventy per-
cent (hypothetically) of the funds received are from members; provided that
the amount contributed by non-members does not exceed a specified
amount or the exemption is lost. Under these provisions, the state's premise
would be that the nature of the solicitation is not sufficiently public for
regulatory purposes until more of the public is involved, more of the funds
received by the organization are public funds or the public contribution
exceeds a specified amount. None of the exemptive provisions, however,
shield the exempted organization from the investigative power of the au-
thorities where fraud or abuse is suspected.
Constructing variations for exemptive provisions is, in many respects, a
ridiculous exercise. These variations are provided, however, to stress a
point. Each of the provisions directly relate to the state's valid concern in
deciding the point at which the solicitation is sufficiently public, or stated
differently, has a substantially greater potential for harm to the public, such
that registration and reporting is important to the monitoring function of
the state. While it may be difficult to determine where this line lies, the
better question is who should have the responsibility in making that deter-
mination and deciding on the exemptive provision to be utilized. Absent
some compelling reason to the contrary, the decision ought to rest with the
sound discretion of the legislature and not the courts.
One compelling reason for having the court step in is represented by
Heritage and Larson. Where the statute singles out religious organizations,
creating a distinction that in reality is a distinction between traditional and
non-traditional religious organizations, first amendment rights are affronted
in a way totally unacceptable absent compelling state interest and a less
intrusive alternative for obtaining the legitimate objective. Even a statute
that is applicable to all religious and non-religious organizations alike could
not withstand a challenge that the exemption is void as applied to religious
organizations because of the profound and disparate effect it would have on
257. 456 U.S. at 251 n.27. If this type of distinction was applied to religious organizations, arguably it
may violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. An exemption from registration ben-
efits the exempted organization, while non-exempted religious organizations suffer the burden of
registration. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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non-traditional religious organizations. In this respect the exemption could
not pass the second and third prongs of the Lemon test.258
III. MODEL LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS REGULATING
CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS
The ultimate goal of a charitable solicitation regulatory scheme is the
substantial reduction, if not the complete elimination, of charitable solicita-
tion fraud and abuse. Simultaneously, the ability of a charitable organiza-
tion to raise needed charitable dollars for its programs must not be unduly
stifled by any regulatory scheme. Moreover, a scheme must not restrict con-
stitutionally protected rights and freedoms. This Part discusses provisions
which should be included within a statute and proposes model provisions.
These provisions, attached in an appendix, consider provisions which may
be found in some state statutes as well as ideas of others. As in Part I, the
provisions considered here are those most directly related to the prevention
of solicitation fraud and abuse. No attempt is made herein to propose an
entire regulatory scheme.
A. Registration, Exemption, and Financial Reporting-Initial Steps to
Regulation
The key to the successful regulation of charitable solicitation fraud and
abuse is the enactment of a statute which is "pro-active" rather than "re-
active" or "passive" in its approach to regulation.2"9 The "pro-active" char-
acteristic of the statute must be triggered the moment an individual or or-
ganization intends to solicit expressly or ostensibly on behalf of a charitable
cause or organization. Therefore, it is basic that a "pro-active" statute pro-
vide, as a precondition to solicitation, that the individual or organization
receive approval to conduct solicitation activity following a registration
process. 260 The registration process must be designed to acquire informa-
tion about the organization, the nature of the solicitation, and the persons
who will be soliciting. 26' The obvious benefit to this registration process is
the ability to gain information and to make appropriate investigations about
the organizations and the solicitation campaign prior to any solicitation.
A statutory scheme that requires only a post-solicitation informational
filing encourages only after-the-fact review, evaluation, and investigation of
the solicitation activity.262 This is not to suggest that post-solicitation infor-
258. See supra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
259. As used herein, the term "pro-active" relates to a statutory scheme which is direct and affirmative
in the steps used to regulate charitable solicitations. It attempts to control and set the permissible
limits of solicitation activity from the outset rather than an after-the-fact review of that activity.
Affirmative acts are required of the soliciting organization whether or not the potential donor has
requested some action from the solicitor. Principles developed in equity or at common law do not
serve as the sole criteria by which the activity is judged.
260. Whether the registrant receives something called a permit or license is not important. It is impor-
tant that the organization file an application or registration statement containing information help-
ful to an agency regulating solicitations and that the same be subject to approval by the agency.
261. See Appendix A, § 1.2-1.7.
262. The author's experience is that oftentimes this ex post facto effort comes too late. The solicitor has
departed and may not be reachable by the agency or the funds have been so dissipated that recov-
ery is not possible.
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mational filings are without value as a means of discovering and correcting
fraudulent practices. Such filings may have a deterrent effect upon fraudu-
lent and abusive conduct. Moreover, such filings are important and neces-
sary to effective regulation when used in conjunction with registration. The
post-solicitation filing provides a report for the benefit of the authorities and
the public.26
3
Like the registration process, the post-solicitation informational filing2M4
should be standardized and accompanied by a report of an independent
public accountant.2 65 Information regarding financial data and the updating
of information should be required as part of the filing.2 6 6 Alternatives or
exemptions to filing audited financial reports may be provided for cases in
which the requirement may prove to be financially burdensome to smaller
charitable organizations or where solicitations do not exceed a statutorily
established monetary limit.2 67 Post-informational filings and investigation
by the agency will be facilitated by the further requirement that the organi-
zation maintain correct and adequate records.268
The point urged is that the ex post facto filing of information alone is
inadequate to promote effective charitable solicitation regulation because an
important time for beginning a monitoring function is lost. If the registra-
tion statement conforms with the statutory requirements, agency approval
is to be given. Thus, no undue burden is imposed upon the organization or
any first amendment rights.
The statute should also provide exemptions from complying with the
registration process and post-informational filing requirments where appro-
priate. 269 Exemptions should apply only to the registration and informa-
tional filings under the statute and not relieve the organization from
complying with the statute's anti-fraud provisions and the need to maintain
complete and accurate records. Moreover, exemptions should not shield or-
ganizations from any investigative procedures the authorities may deem
necessary. Factors which should be considered in deciding whether an ex-
emption ought to be granted include: (1) the existence of another supervi-
sory board, department, or agency that is either governmental or quasi-
governmental and performs a regulatory function; (2) the size of the solici-
tation; (3) the employment of a professional fund raiser or paid solicitors;
and (4) whether solicitations are confined to the current membership or a
defined constituency of the organization.
Distinctions between organizations which receive more than an estab-
lished percentage of their charitable contributions from non-members and
those which do not may no longer be a permissible basis for granting or
263. See infra note 285.
264. See Appendix A, § 2.1-2.5.
265. Audited financial reports enhance the credibility of financial reports. They should also be audited
by certified public accountants. See Gross, Full Disclosure-A Better Answer, PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY, Mar. 1977, at 12, 18.
266. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
267. Gross, supra note 265; Appendix A, § 2.4.
268. Appendix A. § 3.1-3.2.
269. See Appendix B. But see Stevenson, supra note 24, at 37 (providing no exemptions in his model
act).
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denying an exemption in the face of the Supreme Court's rationale in Lar-
son v. Valente.270 Although the case involved a statute which applied only
to religious organizations, the Court questioned the validity of the premises
which support the distinctions.2 7 ' Exempting organizations which solicit
primarily within their own membership would seem justifiable since it is not
primarily a solicitation of the general public. In attempting to define "pri-
marily", it is inevitable that one will be led back to the concerns raised by
the Court in Larson v. Valente.
B. Registration and the Administrative Process27 2
To insure the integrity of the registration process, the agency must have
authority to seek additional information and to investigate the persons, in-
formation, or circumstances surrounding the request for permission to so-
licit, prior to any grant, denial, or revocation of the request.27 3 The
authority to deny, suspend, or revoke registration, as well as the authority
to request additional information or to investigate an organization should
be sufficiently defined or related to the legislative grant of authority so as
not to vest unfettered discretion in the agency or constitute an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority.2 74 For example, denial or revoca-
tion of permission to solicit because the information is incomplete,
inaccurate, or the organization has violated other provisions of the statute
do not present problems, if the statutory provisions are not ambiguous and
a standard for their application is provided.27 5 Permitting the agency to
satisfy itself that a soliciting organization, other than a professional fund
raiser or solicitor, is reputable or that the cause is worthy presents severe
problems. Such grants of authority are unlikely to withstand constitutional
challenge.2 7 6 A statute should therefore include specific reference to the
time in which the agency should act, enunciate with particularity the pow-
ers of the agency, provide for the procedural steps to be followed by an
organization which has been denied permission to solicit or has had such
permission suspended or revoked, and set forth the reasons for which an
approval to solicit would be denied, suspended, or revoked.2 7 7
C. Registration of Professional Fund Raisers
Professional fund raisers 27 8 and professional solicitors2 79 should also be
270. See discussion in Part II, Section B(2)(b).
271. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
272. See Appendix C.
273. Appendix C, § 5.4-5.5.
274. See discussion supra Part II.
275. See Appendix C, § 5.2.
276. See discussion supra Part II. See also American Cancer Society v. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St.
114, 114 N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953); City of Fort Worth v. Craik, 411 S.W.2d 541, 542 (1967).
277. The issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of registration should be consistent with the state's
administrative procedural statutes. Appendix C, § 5.2-5.3; Appendices F and G.
278. "Professional fund raiser" has been generally defined to include
[a]ny person who, for compensation or other consideration, plans, conducts, manages or
advises concerning any drive or campaign in this state for the purpose of soliciting contribu-
tions for or on behalf of any charitable organization of charitable purpose, or who engages
in the business of or holds himself out to persons in this state as independently engaged in
the businessof soliciting contributions for such purposes, or the business of planning, con-
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required to register when consulting, advising, or soliciting on behalf of an
organization which is required to register under the statute.28° Information
regarding the identity of and persons employed by the registrant, as well as
previous activity of the registrant, should be disclosed on the registration
form. Specifically, the registration statement or application should contain
information relative to the name and address of the professional fund-rais-
ing counsel281 or professional solicitor; the names and addresses of all em-
ployees, agents, members, or officers of the professional fund-raising
organization; previous activity of the registrant; whether the professional
fund raiser is authorized by other governmental authorities to act as a pro-
fessional fund raiser; whether the professional or any officer, member,
agent, or employee is or has been enjoined by any court or otherwise pro-
hibited from serving as a professional fund raiser in any jurisdiction; and
the manner in which the solicitation will be conducted. Bonding should be
required to indemnify the state or any person who is injured as a result of
solicitation activities.282 Denial, suspension, and revocation of registration
should be done in a manner consistent with the state's administrative proce-
dure act in general and any procedure for denying, suspending, and revok-
ing charitable solicitation registration in particular. 283  Because the
professional fund raiser or solicitor is seen as engaging in a business, the
state has considerable leeway in regulating this profession. 84
D. Solicitor Information Cards and Disclosure
Information disclosure is a paramount feature of charitable solicitation
regulation.285 Most state statutes provide that the annual reports, financial
ducting, managing, or carrying on any drive or campaign in this state for such solicitations
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.09.020(10) (Supp. 1986); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-1(8)
(1982). The term "professional fund-raising counsel" is used in some statutes and is defined to
include "any person who ... for compensation or other consideration plans, conducts, manages,
carries on, advises or acts as a consultant whether directly or indirectly in connection with solicit-
ing contributions in this state for or on behalf of any charitable organization but who actually
solicits no contributions as a part of such services. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-176(6) (West
1985) (emphasis added). See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 467B-1(10) (1976 & Supp. 1984).
279. "Professional solicitor" is defined to include
any person who, for a financial or other consideration, solicits contributions for, or on
behalf of a charitable organization, whether such solicitation is performed personally or
through his agents, servants or employees specially employed by, or for a charitable organi-
zation . . . in connection with the solicitation of contributions but does not qualify as a
"professional fund-raising counsel .... "
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 467B-1(l 1) (West 1976).
280. See Appendix D.
281. See supra note 278 for definition of fund-raising counsel.
282. In most jurisdictions, enforcement of the charitable solicitations statutes is by the state acting
through the agency or department and the state attorney general. The statutes presumably would
not prevent an injured individual from bringing a common law action for damages. But the cost of
litigation as compared to the injury sustained by an individual foreclose in any real sense an indi-
vidual action. A class action might have a better chance. This does not mean that an individual or
group of individuals will never have an interest. A bond issued to the benefit of the state and
injured individuals recognizes this possibility. Georgia specifically provides for a private right of
action by individuals. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
283. See Appendix C, § 5.2-5.3.
284. See Gospel Army (discussed supra note 165 and accompanying text).
285. Commentators generally agree that disclosure is important in solicitation regulation. See Gross,
Full Disclosure-A Better Answer, supra note 265, at 16; Stevenson, supra note 24, at 35.
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reports, and other information required by statute as post-solicitation filings
become public records available for public inspection.2 86 One issue, how-
ever, has been not whether there should be disclosure, but at what time the
disclosure should be required and what information should be disclosed.2 87
The debate centers on whether there should be a required disclosure of
information at the time of solicitation, "point-of-solicitation" disclosure, or
whether disclosure should be predicated upon a request by the potential
donor, "disclosure-on-demand." 2 8 8 Substantial disagreement exists as to the
efficacy of "point-of-solicitation" disclosure. Proponents argue that disclo-
sure at this stage is needed to insure that potential donors have information
at the time they are deciding whether to contribute.28 9 The California legis-
lature found that fraud and deceit associated with the siphoning of substan-
tial amounts of charitable dollars into fund raising costs could be minimized
by requiring disclosure at the point-of-solicitation, a practice that leads to a
more informed decision on the part of the donor.29 ° It is not enough that
potential donors can write for information or avail themselves of public
records. Most people simply will not bother to seek information in this
manner.
2 9 1
Opponents of "point-of-solicitation" disclosure argue that "meaningful
and balanced information cannot be presented as a part of the solicitation
process. ' , 2 9 2 They argue that this objection is particularly true with respect
to mandatory disclosure of fund-raising costs, administrative costs, and pro-
gram costs as a percentage of contributed dollars.29 3 Opponents further as-
sert that requiring complete information disclosure would make the
solicitation activity a burdensome and costly one to the soliciting organiza-
tions, most likely resulting in a loss of contributions; on the other hand,
requiring less than complete information may make such disclosures
misleading.2 94
The need to have some information available to potential donors out-
weighs the objections that the information presented may not be entirely
286. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103G (1957 & Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1716.04 (Bald-
win 1985).
287. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
288. "Point-of-solicitation" requires certain information to be provided as part of the solicitation mater-
ials. "Disclosure-on-demand" requires the providing of information upon request of the potential
donor. Id.
289. Id.
290. The Legislature declares that the purpose of this article is to safeguard the public against
fraud, deceit and imposition, and to foster and encourage fair solicitation and sales solicita-
tions for charitable purposes, wherein the person from whom the money is being solicited will
know what portion of the money will actually be utilized for charitable purposes. This article
will promote legitimate solicitations and sales solicitation for charitable purposes and restrict
harmful solicitation methods, thus the people of this state will not be misled into giving
solicitors a substantial amount of money which may not in fact be used for charitable
purposes.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510 (West Supp. 1986).
B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109; Gross, supra note 265, at 17; Stevenson, supra note 24, at 40
(arguing that states ought to encourage responsible giving).
B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
The problems associated with regulation of fund-raising cost are discussed infra in Part III, Section
E.
B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 109.
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meaningful or balanced. An initial disclosure of certain specified informa-
tion in a standardized form (to the extent possible) coupled with a state-
ment that more detailed information will be furnished upon request serves
the principal objective of enabling the potential donor to make a reasonably
informed decision whether to contribute or to request additional informa-
tion before making a contribution. The solicitor who feels that the informa-
tion is incomplete may encourage the hesitant donor to seek the additional
information. The solicitor may even provide additional information volun-
tarily. This approach reconciles to some extent the objections of both the
proponents and opponents to "point-of-solicitation" disclosure and "disclo-
sure-on-demand."
Information regarding the name and purpose of the charitable organiza-
tion or charitable cause, the purpose of the solicitation, the amount of gross
proceeds which will be devoted to fund-raising costs expressed as a percent-
age of the gross, the availability of additional information and how it may
be obtained, and the existence of professional fund raisers or paid solicitors
needs to be disclosed at the time the potential donor is solicited.295 Where
professional fund raisers or paid solicitors are not utilized in the solicitation
or an organization is exempt from registering with the agency, disclosure
may be excused. 296 An organization which solicits totally from within its
membership is another situation where an exemption from disclosure re-
quirements is appropriate. Also, the requirement for "point-of-solicitation' '
disclosure could be waived if a charitable organization's fund-raising costs
are projected to be equal to or less than a statutorily established amount.2 97
E. Regulation of Fund-Raising Costs
Regulation of fund-raising costs by statutorily imposing limits on such
costs, expressed as a percentage of gross receipts, is criticized on several
grounds. Critics argue that there is lacking a "universal standard for com-
puting fund-raising costs" and that "a single percentage is a misleading
[and meaningless] factor to use in evaluating an organization's fund-raising
practices."29 They also argue that expressing fund-raising costs as a per-
centage of gross receipts fails to consider and reflect the many factors mak-
ing up such costs. 299 These factors include: the fund-raising method used
and the variation in costs from one method to another, the nature of the
organization and its constituency,3° the purpose or cause of the organiza-
tion or solicitation campaign, 30 ' and the accounting method employed by
295. See Appendix E; Ballow, The New California Charitable Solicitation Disclosure Law: Application
and Needed Amendments, 12 PAC. L.J. 871 (1981).
296. Fund-raising costs substantially increase where professional fund raisers or paid solicitors are em-
ployed. This is not to suggest, however, that the costs are unreasonable or excessive. In fact, a good
argument can be made that all organizations should be made to disclose information so that the
general public can make comparisons among them. Stevenson, supra note 269, at 34.
297. Maine follows this approach. See supra notes 69-71.
298. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 111; Gross, supra note 265, at 14.
299. Gross, supra note 298.
300. This was an articulated concern in Schaumburg and Munson. See discussion supra Part II, Section
(B)(2)(a).
301. Id.
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the organization.32 Additionally, the utilization of percentage limitations
as preventative of fraud is questionable. High fund-raising costs are not nec-
essarily indicative of fraud or unreasonable costs, just as low costs are not
indicative of efficient or reasonable costs. 30 3 Absolute limitations also in-
fringe upon the first amendment rights of some organizations and are there-
fore unconstitutional. 3°4 Fund-raising costs studies3 5 lend support to the
proposition that fund-raising costs cannot be reduced to a single precentage
figure, fairly and reasonably applicable to all types of organizations and
their fund-raising activity.30 6
Employing a percentage limitation to regulate fund-raising costs is not
totally without merit when the percentage has flexible application. The use
of the percentage can serve two goals not inconsistent with the state's inter-
est in curtailing inefficiency in the acquisition and utilization of charitable
dollars. First, the percentage established by the statute no longer becomes a
limitation on fund-raising costs. Instead, it becomes a threshold prompting
the authorities to make further inquiry and investigation into the costs of
the organization in light of all relevant factors if the costs exceed the estab-
lished percent. No presumption needs to be raised that the organization's
fund-raising costs are unreasonable or excessive simply because they are
greater than the established percentage. Similarly, the authorities are not
foreclosed from questioning the reasonableness of an organization's fund-
raising costs which are equal to or less than the established percentage. Sec-
ond, an organization is put on notice that further inquiry and investigation
into the reasonableness of its costs may be forthcoming if costs exceed the
established percentage. Thus, authorities are given a starting point and
charitable organizations are given notice. An assumption is made that the
state will consider relevant information and studies in setting the initial
cost's percentage.30 7
Before preceding further, it is appropriate to mention the utilization of
percentages in the context of disclosure. Although the development of ac-
counting and reporting standards and the availability of financial reports
will be helpful for authorities and corporate or foundation donors, these
standards or reports will provide little help to the unsophisticated donor.
302. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 110-13, 137 n.24; Solomon, Twelve Factors in Determining "Reason-
able" Fund-Raising Costs, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Nov. 1979, at 30 (listing 12 factors which
should be considered in determining the reasonableness of fund-raising costs); Gross, Fund Raising
and Program Cost Ratios, Some Hard Data on the Arbitrary Ratios, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY,
June 1975, at 28 (recognizing that organizations have different objectives or purposes necessitating
different fund-raising methods leading to different cost).
303. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984); Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); B. HOPKINS, supra note 4,
at 112.
304. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
305. The National Society of Fund-Raising Executives, Inc. (NSFRE) undertook a study of fund-rais-
ing costs. See NSFRE, Fund-Raising Costs, A Progress Report, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Oct.
1979, at 19. See also Boyle & Jacobs, Fund-Raising Costs, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Apr. 1979,
at 5 (an economic analysis of fund-raising costs).
306. These studies also provide regulators with valuable information about average fund-raising costs
and the relative weight to be accorded factors of cost. These studies should be considered by legis-
latures in enacting legislation more in tune with the realities of fund-raising. See Boyle & Jacobs,
supra note 305; Gross, supra note 302; McLenithan, Public Disclosure Requirements of Charitable
Organizations, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at 26.
307. McLenithan, supra note 306; Gross, supra note 306.
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AAFRC surveys on giving indicate that the majority of giving in the United
States between 1980 and 1984 was by individuals.3"' While corporate and
foundation donors possess the skill and resources to evaluate information
reported and filed with the authorities, unsophisticated donors have neither
the expertise, resources, or inclination to do so. Requiring disclosure of
fund-raising costs, expressed as a percentage of gross receipts, shifts the
burden to the soliciting organization to provide whatever additional infor-
mation is necessary to explain its costs, instead of requiring unsophisticated
donors to feret out and interpret the information. This is not to say that
donors do not have some responsibility to become responsible givers, but
that information in audit reports is difficult to read and understand for
those not trained to do so. Soliciting organizations should not be able to
fortuitously capitalize on this inability. This does not place an undue bur-
den on the soliciting organization.
The question and focus, then, should not be whether a percentage ap-
proach is adopted as a regulatory measure, but what is the consequence of
reporting fund-raising costs in excess of the established percentage. If the
consequence is a denial of an opportunity to solicit, then the statute not
only violates the Constitution,3"9 but fails to consider realistically the na-
ture of fund-raising costs. An irrebutable presumption of unreasonableness
or excessiveness is created.
The thrust of a statutory provision regulating fund-raising costs should
be the determination that solicited dollars are being acquired and utilized
efficiently. To this end a provision prohibiting the utilization of an unrea-
sonable or excessive portion of money or pledges received in a solicitation
campaign for fund-raising costs is the first step. 3'0 The next step is deter-
mining what is or is not unreasonable or excessive. A standard for deter-
mining reasonableness must be provided as guidance for soliciting
organizations and the authorities. A percentage serves this purpose initially,
but is not to be the determinative standard.31" ' Stephen Solomon 312 and
Bruce Hopkins 313 provide the following list of factors which should be con-
sidered by the authorities:
1. The organization's cause;
2. The organization's purposes;
3. The organization's programs;
4. The public awareness of the organization;
5. The public awareness of the problems dealt with by the organization;
6. The visibility of the problem dealt with by the organization;
7. The public acceptance of the problem dealt with by the organization;
8. The extent of the volunteers which the organization can utilize in its
fund-raising efforts;
9. The fund-raising techniques available to the organization;
10. The size of the average donation contributed to the organization;
308. See supra note 15.
309. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
310. See Appendix F, § 9.1-9.2.
311. Id.
312. Solomon, supra note 302.
313. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 131.
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11. The number of years the organization has been in existence and the
number of years the organization has been soliciting from the public; and
12. Act of God and other unforeseen circumstances.
13. The efforts being made to reduce fund-raising costs.314
In addition to these factors, attention should be given to the accounting
practices for allocating costs among fund-raising, administrative, and pro-
gram activities. To this end, consideration should also be given to adopting
accounting guidelines which take into account the dual aspects of fund-
raising and information dissemination or public advocacy campaigns.
These factors and standards take into account the concerns raised by the
Supreme Court in Munson and Schaumburg. The presumption that high
fund-raising costs are ipsofacto fraudulent or unreasonable is replaced by a
provision that requires careful consideration of costs based upon relevant
and articulated standards. There is substantially less risk that first amend-
ment rights will be offended since the nature of the organization and
its purposes or programs are all to be considered in determining
reasonableness.
Hopkins, an opponent of the use of fund-raising percentages, 3 15 argues
that even if an organization's fund-raising costs are determined to be unrea-
sonable, a statute still overreaches if it prohibits solicitation by that organi-
zation. 3 6 He proposes that the organization be given the choice of
foregoing solicitation activity or disclosing "sufficient information to the
public about its fund-raising expenses at the point of solicitation. 31 7 Under
his proposal, the choice is to be exercised after the costs have been evalu-
ated under the flexible provisions, but determined to be unreasonable or
excessive nonetheless.
J. John Stevenson, in his proposed legislation, adopts a regulatory
scheme in which the level of fund-raising costs, expressed as a percentage of
gross receipts, determines the frequency of mandatory reporting by the or-
ganization.3 " Biennial reporting with the authorities is required if fund-
raising costs are less than thirty-five percent; annual reporting if costs are
between thirty-five and fifty percent; and semi-annual reporting if costs ex-
ceed fifty percent.3 9 Under this approach organizations with lower fund-
raising costs are rewarded with infrequent reporting requirements but orga-
nizations with higher costs are not penalized. He suggests that a disclosure
requirement could be added for organizations whose expenses exceed fifty
percent.32 ° In effect, this proposal does not greatly differ from Hopkin's
proposal, except that the authorities never make a determination of reason-
ableness under Stevenson's proposal.
The troubling aspect of these proposals is that they do not fully consider
314. See Appendix F.
315. Hopkins believes that percentage limitations have inherent unfairness and pose serious constitu-
tional problems, whether they operate conclusively or are irrebuttable. B. HOPKINS supra note 4, at
126-39.
316. Id. at 132.
317. Id.; Appendix F, Alternative Provision.
318. Stevenson, supra note 24.
319. Id. at 38, 39.
320. Id.
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the interest of the state in preventing the diversion of charitable dollars to
non-charitable purposes where it has been determined that fund-raising
costs are unreasonable or excessive. Both of these proposals would grant
organizations the right to solicit irrespective of unreasonable or excessive
costs. The proposals effectively negate the interest and concerns of the state
in promoting and assuring efficient acquisition and utilization of charitable
dollars. The troubling aspect of these proposals is not cured by the assertion
that the state should not substitute its judgment for that of the donor. Pub-
lic disclosure achieves part of the state's objective by encouraging informed
giving by the donor.32' Nothing, however, prevents the adoption of meas-
ures which more directly effectuate the state's purpose and interest. The
Supreme Court did not say in either Munson or Schaumburg that a state is
powerless to prohibit charitable organizations from soliciting if it is found
that fund-raising costs are unreasonable. The Court struck down the legisla-
tion designed to determine unreasonableness and fraud because the legisla-
tion was constitutionally defective and not because the the goals of the
authorities were impermissible. Moreover, it is fallacious to assert that the
state is acting as judge and jury, determining the worthiness of a particular
cause or organization.322 The determination is one of the reasonableness of
expenses and is to be made using objective factors.
A risk inherent in the application of these factors is the determination
by an agency that certain fund-raising methods are per se unreasonable or
fraudulent because of the costs they engender. In Brown v. R.E. Hollo-
way,3 23 a volunteer fireman's organization received about eleven and six-
tenths percent of the proceeds of a fund raising campaign conducted on its
behalf by a professional fund raiser. The contract between the fund raiser
and the organization provided that the fund raiser was to receive sixty per-
cent of the receipts of solicitations as a sales commission out of which he
paid workers and office expenses. 324 From the remaining forty percent,
other expenses were to be paid, after which any balance would be shared
equally between the fund raiser and the organization.325 Similar facts were
found in a Common Pleas court decision 326 where a Kiwanis club received
twelve and six-tenths percent of all solicited funds.32 7
In those two cases, if there were no expenses except sales commissions,
approximately eighty percent of the gross receipts would inure to the benefit
of the fund raiser.328 As expenses not covered by the fund raiser were in-
curred, the receipts to the organizations were further reduced. The very
321. See id. at 35, 40; B. HOPKINS, supra note 4.
322. See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 40; B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 123.
323. Holloway, Case No. CA-6698 (Ct. App. Motgomery County, Ohio, July 15, 1981).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Hamilton Productions, Case No. 78-CU-12-5812 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, October 13, 1981).
327. The contract between the fund raiser and organization provided that the fund raiser would receive
60% of family ticket sales and 50% of business ticket sales and gate sales as commissions. Id. The
contract also provided that after the payment of other expenses from the remaining 40% and 50%,
respectively, any balance was to be shared equally between the fund raiser and the organization. Id.
328. In Holloway, 60% plus 50% of the remaining 40% (totaling 80%) of gross sales would go to the
fund raiser. In Hamilton, 60% plus 50% of the remaining 40% (totaling 80%) of gross family
ticket sales and 50% plus 50% of the remaining 50% (totalling 75%) of gross business ticket sales
would go to the fund raiser.
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nature of the fund-raising contract caused solicitation costs to be excessive
and unreasonable. In both Holloway and Hamilton, the courts found fraud
and misrepresentation upon the general public, who were led to believe that
a substantial part of the funds would be used for charitable programs.
An agency exercising discretion pursuant to legislation like that in Na-
tional Foundation or the provision proposed in Appendix F would probably
label such fund-raising costs unreasonable. Does this mean that the contract
is unreasonable per se? It is the contract terms which result in substantial
funds being diverted away from charitable purposes. These contracts are
typically used in a boiler room telephone solicitation.329 One might there-
fore conclude that this method of solicitation is unreasonable per se since it
will invariably have associated with it a high fund-raising cost.330 One of
the factors to be considered in determining reasonableness is the nature of
the fund-raising method used, whether alternatives exist, and whether such
a fund-raising method is appropriate for certain organizations. Another al-
ternative might be to prohibit the payment of compensation when solicita-
tions are made by telephone.33'
In short, a statutory provision regulating fund-raising costs by means of
a percentage, if it is to withstand a constitutional challenge, must not oper-
ate conclusively. Factors and standards which are to be considered in arriv-
ing at a determination of reasonableness should be set forth in the statute in
order to provide guidance to the authorities and the soliciting
organizations.
F. Enforcement and Penalties33 2
The need for an enforcement mechanism and penalties in a charitable
solicitation statute is obvious. Generally, the statute should grant the au-
thorities the power to conduct investigations of organizations and their so-
licitation activities.333 A wider range of penalties should also be available
where violators are found, including but not limited to:334 denial, suspen-
sion, and revocation of a registration statement;335 civil and criminal reme-
dies;336 and injunctive relief.337 The statute may want to expressly provide
329. The "boiler-room" operation in both Hamilton and Holloway involved the establishment of a tele-
phone bank staffed by many individuals. The individuals call prospective donors from either a
telephone book or, most often, from a prepared donor list reading a solicitation pitch usually
prepared in advance. If a donor agrees to give, a notation is made by the donor's name and ar-
rangements are made to collect the donations. Usually the callers are not volunteers. See Holloway,
Case No. CA 6689 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio, July 15, 1981) at 3-4.
330. While these two cases represent an extreme, it is possible that an organization could be negatively
affected if the legislation, even if flexible, did not consider the appropriateness and availability of
fund-raising methods to the organization. See Gross, supra note 265, at 32; Solomon, supra note
302, at 32.
331. The District of Columbia prohibits persons from conducting or making for charitable purposes a
solicitation by telephone for pecuniary compensation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-708 (Michie 1981 &
Supp. 1985). But see Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Attorney General, 391
Mass. 709, 464 N.E.2d 55 (1984) (holding a similar provision in the Massachusetts statute uncon-
stitutional as unnecessary infringement on private speech).
332. Appendix H.
333. Appendix C, § 5.4-5.5.
334. See generally supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
335. Appendix C, § 5.2-5.3.
336. Appendix H, § 10.1.
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for a private cause of action for individuals harmed as a result of solicitation
activity.338
CONCLUSION
Two facts regarding fund raising and the fund-raising industry may be
stated with relative certainty. First, there will be a continuing need for the
public to financially support, through charitable giving, organizations pro-
viding charitable programs and services. Second, in all probability, fraud
and other abuses associated with the quest for public dollars, including inef-
ficient acquistition and utilization of those dollars, will also continue. Ac-
cordingly, the focus and goal of the state in regulating charitable
solicitation should be the significant curtailment, if not elimination, of that
fraud and abuse without imposing an undue burden on fund-raising
activity.
The obvious first step in controlling solicitation fraud and abuse is the
willingness of the state to enact legislation "pro-active" rather that "re-ac-
tive" in its regulation of charitable solicitation. The United States Constitu-
tion does not prohibit states from legislatively regulating charitable
solicitation, but sets the framework for that legislation. Such legislation
must be considered and drafted in the context of that constitutional frame-
work. The above provisions are both "pro-active" and within the bounds of
the Constitution.
Several additional components of active regulation also need to be men-
tioned.3 3 9 States need to work together to develop uniform laws respecting
charitable solicitation regulation. At the very minimum, effort needs to be
made to establish uniform registration and reporting provisons. Profes-
sional fund-raising organizations, interested fund-raising associations, pri-
vate watchdog organizations, and soliciting organizations must have input
in the preparation of this legislation. Relevant data should be considered,
and, when appropriate, studies conducted so that legislation is not drafted
in a vacuum but is in tune with the realities and practical necessities of fund
raising. A cooperative atmosphere needs to be fostered and mechanisms es-
tablished among states (administering agencies, attorneys general, or secre-
taries of state), professional fund-raising organizations, interested fund-
raising associations, and private watchdog organizations to facilitate the
communication and sharing of information. States must also be willing to
provide administering agencies with adequate personnel and financial re-
sources sufficient to enforce the statutes and regulations.
The role of education in the "pro-active" regulation of charitable solici-
tation is not to be slighted. Concerted effort ought to be made to educate the
public on the importance and necessity of its role in responsible charitable
giving. Equally important and needed is an educational program directed at
337. Id. § 10.3.
338. See Georgia statute, supra note 85.
339. See R. Abrams, Regulating Charity--The State's Role, REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 481 (1980); Quandt,
The Regulation of Charitable Fund Raising and Spending Activities, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1158, 1185-
87.
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charitable organizations and professional fund raisers concerning their re-
sponsibility in promoting efficient fund raising and fund management. The
education process should not be relegated to the state but should involve
every segment of the fund-raising community.
Finally, the state must look for ways to reduce the regulatory burden on
soliciting organizations without emasculating the effectiveness of legisla-
tion. Exemptions from registration and reporting already provide appropri-
ate relief to some organizations. Uniform legislation and standardization of
registration and reporting formats among the states will help immensely.
Coordinating the role and regulatory effects of muncipalities and other reg-
ulators will also relieve some of the burden on charities. "Pro-active" legis-
lation coupled with the above as well as other suggestions should not only
deal a decisive blow to solicitation fraud and abuse, but strengthen the
fund-raising industry to the benefit of all.
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APPENDIX A
REGISTRATION, REPORTING, RECORDS
Section 1 Registration Statement
Section 1.1 Every charitable organization which intends to solicit charitable contributions
within this state, or have funds solicited on its behalf, shall, prior to any solicitation, file a
registration statement with the agency upon forms prescribed by it and obtain a certificate of
registration.
Section 1.2 The registration statement shall contain the following information:
a. The name of the organization;
b. The address of the organization;
c. The names and addresses of any chapters, branches, or affiliates and other persons which
will share in the charitable contributions received from persons in this state;
d. The place and date the organization was legally established, if applicable, and a refer-
ence to any determination of its tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. (In the
initial application, true copies shall be submitted of any articles of incorporation or constitu-
tion, any bylaws, any tax exempt status letter from the Internal Revenue Service including
any letter of determination status and any agreements of affiliation. Subsequent applications
shall contain only any change or revocation of these documents);
e. The names, addresses, and occupations of the officers, directors, trustees, persons who
are directly in charge of the fund-raising activities, and persons who have custody of the
financial records or custody of the contributions and a statement whether any such person
has been convicted of a felony;
f. A copy of a financial statement in a consolidated report audited by an independent pub-
lic accountant for the organization's immediately preceding fiscal year or, if none, for the
present fiscal year or part thereof; the information reported shall be that provided for in
section 2.3 of this chapter. (The information to be reported shall be filed in conformity with
sections 2.1-2.4 of this chapter);
g. A statement indicating whether the organization is authorized by any other governmen-
tal authority to solicit contributions and whether it, or any officer, professional fund-raising
counsel, or professional solicitor thereof, is or has ever been enjoined by any court or other-
wise prohibited from soliciting contributions in any jurisdiction;
h. A statement indicating whether the organization solicits contributions from the public
directly or has such done on its behalf by others;
i. The location of the person's financial records;
j. The method by which the solicitation is made, including a statement as to whether such
solicitation is conducted by voluntary unpaid solicitors, by professional solicitors, or both; a
narrative description of the promotional plan together with copies of all advertising material
which has been prepared for public distribution by any means of communication and the
location of all telephone solicitation facilities;
k. The names and addresses of any professional fund-raising counsel or professional solici-
tors who are acting or who have agreed to act on behalf of the organization together with
copies of contracts between the organization and professional fund-raising counsel or profes-
sional solicitors relating to financial compensation or profit to be derived by the professional
fund-raising counsel or professional solicitors. (Where any such contract is executed after
filing of the registration statement, a copy thereof shall be filed within days of execution);
1. The period of time during which the solicitations are made and, if less than statewide, the
area, or areas, in which such solicitation generally takes place;
m. The purposes for which contributions to be solicited are used, the total amount of funds
proposed to be raised thereby, and the use or disposition made of the charitable contribu-
tions received;
n. The name or names under which the organization solicits contributions;
o. A sample copy of the authorization issued to individuals soliciting by means of personal
contact in its behalf;
p. The name and address of an agent authorized to accept service of process in this state;
q. A statement indicating whether an agreement exists which permits another to use its
name in a charitable solicitation and a copy of any accounting of the solicitation promotion;
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r. Such other information as may be reasonably required by the agency for the public inter-
est or for the protection of contributors.
Section 1.3 The agency shall be notified in writing, accompanied by any appropriate docu-
ment, of any change in the information contained in the registration statement within
days after the change occurs.
Section 1.4 Except as otherwise herein provided, the registration forms and any other docu-
ments prescribed by the agency shall be signed by an authorized officer and by the chief fiscal
officer of the charitable organization, and such forms and documents shall be verified under
oath and shall be accompanied by the registration fee.
Section 1.5 A chapter, branch, or affiliate, except an independent member, of a federated
fund-raising organization upon mutual agreement may report all of the required information
to its parent organization with which it is affiliated, which shall then transmit such informa-
tion as to its affiliates, branches, chapters, to the agency along with its own statement, except
as provided in section 2.5. An independent member of a federated fund-raising organization
shall comply with the provisions of this section independently.
Section 1.6 Any organization, chapter, branch, affiliate, or member organization contracting
with a professional fund-raiser or solicitor shall report the agreement in writing, with a copy
of the contract, to the agency within - days of the contract agreement and shall have the
approval of the agency prior to making any solicitations. In addition, any chapter, branch,
affiliate, or member organization of a parent organization or federated fund-raising organiza-
tion shall file for renewal separately from the parent organization or federated fund-raising
organization when contracting with a professional solicitor. The affiliate shall also pay a
separate registration fee and file a financial statement or audit with opinion as prescribed
herein.
Section 1.7 It shall be the duty of every charitable organization to ensure that persons who
solicit contributions from the public on behalf of the charitable organization have proper
identification. Professional solicitors and their employees shall be required to have and pro-
duce or display, on demand, identification indicating that the said solicitor has been duly
authorized by the organization for which he is soliciting. Such identification shall include but
not be limited to, the name of the holder of the identification and the name and number of
the certificate of the charitable organization, if applicable, and the information which may be
required by section 7.3 of this article.
[See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.52
(West 1976 & Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-7 (1981 & Supp. 1983).]
Section 2 Annual Reports
Section 2.1 Every charitable organization required to file a registration statement pursuant to
section 1.1 shall file an annual report with the agency upon forms prescribed by it on or
before _. For cause shown the agency may extend the time for filing the annual report.
Section 2.2 The annual report shall include a financial statement covering the immediately
preceding 12 months period of operation, and shall be executed by any authorized officer and
by the chief fiscal officer of the charitable organization, who shall acknowledge that it was
executed pursuant to resolution of the board of directors or trustees, or if there be no such
board, then by its managing group which has approved the content of the annual report.
Section 2.3 The financial statement shall include a balance sheet, statement of income and
expense, and statement of functional expenses, shall be consistent with forms furnished by
the agency, and shall be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples and accounting reporting procedures established by the agency so as to make a full
disclosure of the following, including necessary allocations between each item and the basis
of such allocation:
a. Total receipts and total income from all sources;
b. Cost of management and general;
c. Cost of fund raising;
d. Cost of public education;
e. Funds or properties transferred out of state, with explanation as to recipient and
purpose;
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f. Total net amount disbursed or dedicated within this state, broken down into total
amounts disbursed or dedicated for each major purpose, charitable or otherwise;
g. Names of professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitors used during the
accounting year and the financial compensation or profit resulting to each.
h. The report shall be accompanied by an opinion signed by an independent public ac-
countant that such statement fairly represents the financial operations of the charitable or-
ganization; provided that if total support and revenue exceeds __ for the fiscal year or part
thereof, the report shall be audited by a certified public accountant.
Section 2.4 The agency shall adopt rules for simplified reporting by organizations whose
total support and revenue is __ or less.
Section 2.5 Where a registration statement has been filed by a parent organization, the regis-
tered parent organization may file the annual report required under this section on behalf of
the chapter, branch, or affiliate in addition to or as part of its own report or the registered
affiliate may file the annual report required under this section on behalf of the parent organi-
zation in addition to or as part of its own report. The accounting information required under
this section shall be set forth separately and not in consolidated form with respect to every
chapter, branch, area office, similar affiliate or person within the state which raises or ex-
pends more than _. The agency may permit any chapter, branch, or affiliate to file a consol-
idated statement with any other chapter, branch, affiliate, or parent organization if it is
determined that the interests of the charitable beneficiaries will not be prejudiced thereby
and that separate acounting information is not required for proper supervision.
[See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.53 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).]
Section 3 Books, Records & Contracts-Record Keeping
Section 3.1 Charitable organizations and professional fund-faising counsel or professional
solicitors, required to be registered under this chapter, shall maintain accurate, current, and
readily available books and records at their usual business locations, as designated in the
registration statement filed with the agency, until at least three years shall have elapsed
following the effective period to which they relate.
Section 3.2 All contracts between professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitors
and charitable organizations shall be in writing and true and correct copies of such contracts
or records thereof shall be kept on file in the various offices of the charitable organization
and/or professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor for a three-year period as
provided in this section. Such records and contracts shall be available for inspection and
examination by the agency.
[See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 467B-5 (1976 & Supp. 1984).]
APPENDIX B
Section 4 Exemption
Section 4.1 The following charitable organizations shall not be required to file an annual
registration statement with the agency.
a. Any religious corporation, trust, or organization incorporated or established for reli-
gious purposes, or any agency or organization incorporated or established for charitable,
hospital, or educational purposes, and engaged in effectuating one or more of such purposes,
which is affiliated with, operated by, or supervised or controlled by a corporation sole or
other religious corporation, trust, or organization incorporated or established for religious
purposes, or any other religious agency or organization which serves religion by the the
preservation of religious rights and freedom from persecution or prejudice or by fostering
religion, including the moral and ethical aspects of a particular religious faith;
b. Any educational institution, the curriculum of which in whole or in part, is registered or
approved by the state board of education, either directly or by acceptance of accreditation by
an accrediting body recognized by the state board of education and any foundation or de-
partment having as established identity with any of the aforementioned educational
institutions;
c. Any charitable organization when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the
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membership of the organization and when the solicitation is managed and conducted solely
by officers and members of such organization. (The term "membership" shall not include
those persons who are granted a membership upon making a contribution as a result of the
solicitation);
d. Any persons requesting contributions for the relief of named individuals when the solici-
tation is managed and conducted solely by persons who are unpaid for such services; and
when all of the contributions collected, without any deductions whatsoever except for the
actual cost of a banquet, dance, or similar social gathering, are turned over to the named
beneficiary or beneficiaries;
e. Any charitable organization which does not intend to solicit and receive and does not
actually raise or receive contributions from the public in excess of - during a calendar year
or does not receive contributions from more than __ persons during a calendar year, if all of
their functions, including fund-raising activities, are carried on by persons who are unpaid
for their services and if no part of their assets or income inures to the benefit of or is paid to
any officer or member. Nevertheless, if the contributions raised from the public, whether all
of such is or is not received by any charitable organization during any calendar year, shall be
in excess of _, it shall, within thirty days after the date it shall have received total contribu-
tions in excess of -, register with and report to the agency as required by this article;
f. A local post, camp, or chapter of a bona fide veterans' organization which issues charters
to such local post, camp, or chapter throughout this state, a bona fide organization of volun-
teer firemen, a bona fide ambulance or rescue squad association or a bona fide auxiliary or
affiliate of any such organization, provided all its fund-raising activities are carried on by
members of such an organization or an affiliate thereof, and such members receive no com-
pensation directly or indirectly therefor;
g. Hospitals which are non-profit and charitable and whose budgets are subject to review
by "hospital commission."
[See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 68, § 20 (West 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-5 (1981 &
Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE. § 29-19-6 (1980 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.09.030 (1978 & Supp. 1985).]
APPENDIX C
Section 5 Grant, Denial, Suspension, or Revocation of Registration
Section 5.1 Within - days from the receipt of a registration statement the agency shall
review and examine the same, and if it finds the statement to be in conformity with the
requirements of this chapter and all relevant rules and regulations, it shall enter an order
approving the registration and issue a certificate of registration.
Section 5.2 By order, the agency may deny, suspend, or revoke registration if it finds that the
organization:
a. has filed a registration statement which is incomplete in any material respect or contains
any statement which in light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or mislead-
ing with respect to any material fact;
b. has engaged in a fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practice;
c. is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction from en-
gaging in or continuing any conduct or practice involving any aspect of charitable
solicitation;
d. has used charitable contributions for purposes not stated in the registration statement;
or
e. has violated or failed to comply with any provision of this chapter or any rule or regula-
tion under this chapter.
Section 5.3 If the agency intends to deny, suspend, or revoke the registration of an organiza-
tion it shall notify the organization of its intent to deny, suspend, or revoke the registration.
The notification shall contain the reasons for the action and shall inform the organization of
its right to correct the matter or request an administrative hearing within - days of the
receipt of the notification. The denial, suspension, or revocation shall become effective _
days after the receipt of the notification unless the matter is corrected or a request for an
administrative hearing is received by the agency before the expiration of such time. If a
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hearing is requested and the denial, suspension, or revocation is upheld, the denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation shall become effective upon the service of the final order of the agency.
Section 5.4 The agency is authorized and empowered:
a. to make public or private investigations within or outside the state as it deems necessary
to determine whether any organization has violated or is about to violate any provision of
this chapter or any rule or regulation or order thereunder, or to aid in the enforcement or
this chapter in the prescribing of rules and forms thereunder, and to publish information,
concerning the violation of this chapter or any rule, or regulation or order thereunder;
b. to require or permit any person to file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as
the agency determines, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter being
investigated.
Section 5.5 For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this chapter, the
agency or any person designated may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses
and compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda, agreements, or other documents of records which the agency
deems relevant or material to the inquiry.
[See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.13 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.533,
.58 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-11, -18 (1981 & Supp. 1983).]
APPENDIX D
Section 6 Registration of Professional Fund Raisers; Bond Requirement
Section 6.1 No person shall act as a professional solicitor for a charitable organization sub-
ject to the provisions of this chapter unless registered with the agency.
Section 6.2 The registration statement shall be in writing, under oath, and in a form pre-
scribed by the agency. The statement shall require information as to the identity and previ-
ous related activities of the registrant as may be necessary or appropriate for the public
interest or for the protection of contributors and such other information as the agency may
require. The registration statement shall be accompanied by an annual fee in the sum of _.
A partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship which is a professional fund-raising coun-
sel or professional solicitor may register for and pay a single fee on behalf of all its members,
officers, agents, servants, and employees. However, the names and addresses of all members,
officers, agents, servants, and employees of professional fund-raising counsel or professional
solicitors shall be listed in the registration statement.
Section 6.3 At the time of filing the registration statement the applicant shall file with and
have approved by the agency a bond in which applicant shall be the principal obligor in the
sum of _ dollars issued by a surety company authorized to do business in the state and
which shall remain in effect so long as a registration is in effect. The bond shall issue to the
benefit of the state and any person who may have a cause of action for the reimbursement of
any losses resulting from malfeasance, nonfeasance, or misfeasance in the conduct of solicita-
tion activities. A partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship which is a professional
fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor may file a consolidated bond on behalf of its
members, officers, agents, servants, and employees.
Section 6.4 Each registration shall be valid for a period of one year and may be renewed for
additional one-year periods upon written application under oath in a form prescribed by the
agency, payment of the renewal fee, and proof that the required bond is and will remain in
effect.
Section 6.5 The granting, denying, suspension, or revocation of registration shall be in con-
formity with sections 5.1-5.5 of this chapter (Appendix C).
[See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-181 (West 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103F
(1957 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.09.190 (1978 & Supp. 1985).]
APPENDIX E
Section 7 Soliticitation Disclosure Requirements
Section 7.1 No individual shall solicit in this state unless the solicitor exhibits to the prospec-
tive contributor a solicitor information card or a copy thereof, produced and authenticated
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as provided by the agency. The card shall be signed and dated by an individual who is a
principal, staff member, or officer of the soliciting organization. In lieu of exhibiting the card,
the solicitor may distribute during the course of the solicitation any printed material pro-
vided such material complies with the provisions provided in section 7.3 and provided that
the solicitor informs the prospective contributor that such information as required by section
7.3 is contained in the printed material.
Section 7.2 If the initial solicitation is made by radio, television, letter, telephone, or by any
other means not involving a direct personal contact with the potential contributor, the solici-
tation shall clearly disclose the information required by section 7.3. In a solicitation covered
by this subsection, other than telephone solicitations, if a contribution is subsequently made,
a solicitor information card or other printed material as provided in section 7.1 shall be
mailed to or otherwise delivered to the contributor. If the solicitation is made by telephone
by a solicitor and a potential contributor consents or agrees to make a contribution, a solici-
tor information card or other material as provided in section 7.1 shall be mailed to or other-
wise delivered to the contributor prior to accepting the contribution.
Section 7.3 The information on the solicitor information card shall include the following:
a. The name and address of the organization, or in the case of a combined campaign, the
name of each organization or fund on behalf of which all or any part of the money collected
will be utilized for charitable purposes;
b. The manner in which the money collected will be used for charitable purposes if there is
no organization or fund;
c. Stated as a percentage of the total gift, the amount that will be used for charitable
purposes;
d. The total cost that is estimated will be used for direct fund-raising expenses if profes-
sional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitors are paid a set fee rather than a percent-
age of the total of the gross receipts raised;
e. A statement to the effect that an audited financial statement of the organization may be
obtained by contacting the organization at the address disclosed;
f. The nontax-exempt status of the organization or fund, if the organization or fund for
which the money or funds are being solicited does not have a charitable tax exemption under
both federal and state law;
g. The percentage of the total gift or purchase price which may be deducted as a charitable
contribution under both federal and state law. If no portion is so deductible the card shall
state, "This contribution is not tax deductible."
Section 7.4 Any person who solicits on behalf of an organization exempt from complying
with sections 1.1-1.7 of this Article (registration requirements) and who is not a professional
fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor may satisfy the disclosure provisions by provid-
ing the name and address of the organization on behalf of which all or part of the money
collected will be utilized for charitable purposes, the charitable purposes for which the solici-
tation is made, and by stating to the person solicited that information about revenues and
expenses of such organization, including administration and fund-raising costs, may be ob-
tained by contacting the organization's office at the address disclosed. The organization shall
provide such information to the person solicited within - days after receipt of the request.
[See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.3-.4 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-705 (1981 & Supp. 1985).]
APPENDIX F*
Section 8 Regulation of Fund-raising Costs
Section 8.1 No charitable organization, except as provided herein, shall pay or incur, or
enter into an agreement to pay or incur in connection with any fund-raising activity, fund-
raising expenses, as defined herein, that constitute an unreasonable and excessive portion of
the total moneys, pledges, and/or property raised or received by reason of any find-raising
activity. Except as provided in section 8.2 and section 8.3, expenses paid or incurred, or
agreed to be paid or incurred by a charitable organization in connection with fund-raising
* Appendix F is the proposed provision of Bruce Hopkins, paraphrased.
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activity in excess of - percent of total moneys, pledges, or property raised or received by
reason of any fund-raising activity is an unreasonable and excessive portion of such total
gross receipts.
Section 8.2 For purposes of this section, the total gross receipts raised or received shall be
adjusted so as not to include contributions received equal to the actual cost to the charitable
organization of
a. goods, food, entertainment, drink, or services sold or provided to the public, or
b. the actual postage paid to the United States Postal Service and printing expense in con-
nection with soliciting contributions. (These costs shall not be included as fund-raising
costs.)
Section 8.3 Expenses paid or incurred or agreed to be paid or incurred which exceed __
percent shall be permitted if, after consideration of special facts and circumstances, it is
determined that such higher expenses are reasonable. The requirements and factors to be
considered in determing the reasonableness of fund-raising expenses of charitable organiza-
tion include the following:
a. The length of time the charitable organization has been in existence or has engaged in
public solicitation of funds;
b. The nature of the charitable organizations programs and purposes;
c. Whether the charitable organization advocates causes or disseminates substantive infor-
mation to the public as part of the same process by which the organization solicits
contributions;
d. The nature of and extent of the charitable organization's constituency;
e. The method of fund-raising selected or available to the charitable organization;
f. The average size of contributions received by the charitable organization;
g. The estimate by a charitable organization of fund-raising expenses and any plans for
future reduction of fund-raising expenses;
h. The extent to which fund-raising expenses have been affected by unforeseen
circumstances.
A charitable organization is not generally required to satisfy all of the factors in (a) through
(h). The factors relevant in the case of an organization and the weight accorded to any one
or more of them may differ depending upon the pertinent facts and circumstances. The
agency shall promulgate rules or regulations for the implementation of this subsection.
Section 8.4 A charitable organization, the annual fund-raising expenses of which are deter-
mined to constitute an unreasonable and excessive portion of the total moneys, pledges, and/
or property raised or received by reason of any solicitation activity, following an application
of the requirements and factors enumerated in section 8.3 shall be prohibited from soliciting
contributions in the state for a period of at least twelve months from the date of such
determination.
Alternative Provision
Section 8.4 A charitable organization, the fund-raising expenses of which are determined to
constitute an unreasonable and excessive portion of the total moneys, pledges, and/or prop-
erty raised or received by reason of any solicitation activity, following an application of the
requirements and factors enumerated in section 8.3 shall include, in a conspicuous place on
all solicitation material required pursuant to sections 7.1-7.4, the additional statement: THE
FUND-RAISING EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS SOLICITATION AC-
TIVITY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE AGENCY TO BE UNREASONABLE.
APPENDIX G
Section 9 Prohibited Acts
Section 9.1 No charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional
solicitor shall use or exploit the fact of registration under this chapter so as to lead the public
to believe that such registration in any manner constitutes an endorsement or approval by
this state, provided, however, that the use of the following statement shall not be deemed a
prohibited exploitation, "Registered with the Agency as required by law. Registration does
not imply endorsement of a public solicitation for contributions."
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Section 9.2 No person shall, in connection with the solicitation of contributions or the sale of
tangible personal property or services represent, or lead anyone by any manner, means, prac-
tice or device whatsoever to believe, that the person on whose behalf such solicitation or sale
is being conducted is a bona fide charitable organization or that the proceeds of such solicita-
tion or sale will be used for charitable purposes, if he has reason to believe such not to be the
fact.
Section 9.3 No person shall in connection with the solicitation of contributions or the sale of
tangible personal property or services for charitable purposes represent, or lead anyone by
any manner, means, practice, or device whatsoever to believe, that any other person sponsors
or endorses such solicitation of contributions, sale of tangible personal property, or services
for charitable purposes or approves of such charitable purposes or a charitable organization
connected therewith when such other person has not given written consent to the use of his
name for these purposes.
Any member of the board of directors or trustees of a charitable organization or any
other person who has agreed either to serve or to participate in any voluntary capacity in the
campaign shall be deemed thereby to have given his consent to the use of his name in said
campaign. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the publication of names of con-
tributors without their written consents, in an annual or other periodic report issued by a
charitable organization for the purpose of reporting on its operations and affairs to its mem-
bership or for the purpose of reporting contributions to contributors.
Section 9.4 No person shall make any representation that he is soliciting contributions for or
on behalf of a charitable organization or shall use or display any emblem, device, or printed
matter belonging to or associated with a charitable organization for the purpose of soliciting
or inducing contributions from the public without first being authorized to do so by the
charitable organization.
Section 9.5 No charitable organization soliciting contributions shall use a name, symbol, or
statement so closely related or similar to that used by another charitable organization or
governmental agency that the use thereof would tend to confuse or mislead the public.
Section 9.6 No charitable organization and no person acting on behalf of a charitable organi-
zation shall use any uniformed personnel of any local, state, or federal agency or department
to solicit contributions. This subdivision shall not apply to firemen who solicit contributions
in uniform.
Section 9.7 No charitable organization and no person acting on behalf of a charitable organi-
zation shall use or employ any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, mis-
leading statement, misleading name, mark, or identification, or deceptive practice, method,
or device, with the intent that others should rely thereon in connection with any charitable
solicitation, including any such actions or omissions designed to confuse or mislead a person
to believe that such organization is another organization having the same or like purposes; or
to believe that the funds being solicited are or will be used for purposes and programs con-
ducted within or for persons located within this state when such is not the case; or to other-
wise present purposes and uses of the funds which are not as provided within the purposes
and use filed upon registration of said organization under this chapter, or if no such registra-
tion has been filed, then as provided under the exemption of said organization from federal
and state income taxes as a organization formed and operating for charitable purposes as
defined herein.
Section 9.8 No professional solicitor or his agent, servant, or employee, or any other person
shall solicit in the name of or on behalf of any charitable organization unless:
a. Such solicitor has first obtained written authorization of two officers of such organiza-
tion on a form approved by the agency, a copy of which authorization shall be filed with the
agency. Such written authorization shall bear the signature of the solicitor and shall ex-
pressly state on its face the period for which it is valid, which shall not exceed one year from
the date issued.
b. Such solicitor or his agent, servant, or employee carries such authorization with him
when making solicitation and exhibits the same on request to persons solicited or police
officers or other law enforcement officials or agents of the agency, or, if such solicitations are
made by telephone, such solicitor has,'in his application for registration required pursuant to
section 1.2(j), expressly stated his intention to make telephone solicitations and has attached
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to the application the proposed text of any such telephone solicitations and all such solicita-
tions are made substantially in accordance with the proposed text. Professional solicitors
shall also submit a copy of any literature or written material used in solicitation.
c. Prior to beginning any solicitation, such professional solicitor has filed with the agency a
copy of any written agreement or contract which may have been entered into between a
charitable organization and the professional solicitor. If the agreement or contract is not in
writing, a written statement of the agreement setting forth the terms and conditions of the
agreement, including the solicitor's compensation, shall be filed with the agency within __
days after the contract agreement and prior to beginning any solicitation. Within - days
after any change, modification, or termination of any agreement, notice of such change,
modification or termination shall be filed with the agency along with a true copy of any
written change or modification or a statement in writing setting forth the terms and condi-
tions of any change or modification not in writing.
Section 9.9 No charitable organization shall accept any contribution exceeding five dollars in
cash or tangible property without providing on request of the donor a written receipt ac-
knowledging such contribution and personally signed by the person accepting such
contribution.
Section 9. 10 No person, and no organization of which such person is an officer, professional
fund-raising counsel, or professional solicitor, shall solicit within this state if:
a. Such person has been convicted in any jurisdiction of embezzlement, larceny, or other
crime involving the obtaining of money or property by false pretenses or the misapplication
of funds impressed with a trust, unless such person has received a pardon for such offense or
the public is informed of such conviction in a manner approved in writing by the agency
before any solicitation occurs; or
b. Such person has ever been enjoined by any court or otherwise prohibited from soliciting
in any jurisdiction, unless the agency shall first determine in writing that such person is
entitled to solicit in such jurisdicton at the time of soliciting within this state or that the
reason for such injunction or prohibition does not involve moral turpitude.
Section 9.11 No charitable organization shall employ any professional fund-raising counsel
or professional solicitor unless and until such fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor
has registered pursuant to this chapter.
Section 9.12 No professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor shall enter into
any contract or raise any funds for any organization required to be registered pursuant to
this chapter unless such charitable organization has registered.
Section 9.13 No professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor required to be
registered under this chapter shall employ any professional solicitor who is not registered in
accordance with this chapter.
[See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.11 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103J
(1957 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.55 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 174-a (McKinney 1982); VA. CODE. § 57-57 (1980 & Supp. 1985).]
APPENDIX H
Section 10 Enforcement and Penalties
Section 10.1 A charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional so-
licitor which wilfully fails to file a registration statement, report, or other inforination with
the agency or willfully files such a statement, report, or other information which is materi-
ally false, or otherwise willfully violates the requirements of this subtitle, is guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than __ or sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than _, or be both fined and imprisoned. An officer, director, partner, or
trustee of a charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional solici-
tor which is organized in corporate, partnership, or other organizational form who causes
the entity to commit a willful violation of this subtitle is also guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
upon conviction, is subject to the same penalties as the entity.
Section 10.2 The agency, upon its own motion or uopn complaint of any person, may investi-
gate any charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional solicitor
to determine whether such charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or pro-
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fessional solicitor has violated the provisions of this chapter or has filed any application or
other information required under this chapter which contains false or misleading statements.
Section 10.3 Whenever the Attorney General shall have reason to believe that any charitable
organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional solicitor is operating in viola-
tion of the provisions of this chapter or has knowingly and willfully made any false state-
ment in any registration application or statement, report, or other information required by
this chapter, or that a charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or profes-
sional solicitor has refused or failed to file a registration statement required by this chapter,
or that there is about to be employed in any solicitation or collection of contributions for a
charitable organization any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or obtain money or prop-
erty by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise, or that the officers or repre-
sentatives of any charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional
solicitor have refused or failed after notice to produce any records of such organization, or
that the funds raised by solicitation activities are not devoted or will not be devoted to the
charitable purposes of the charitable organization, in addition to all other actions authorized
by law, the Attorney General may bring an action in the name of the state against such
charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, or professional solicitor and any
other person who has participated or is about to participate in such solicitation to enjoin
such charitable organization, professional fund-raising counsel, professional solicitor, or
other person from continuing such violation, solicitation, or collection, or engaging therein,
or doing any acts in furtherance thereof and for such other relief as the court deems
appropriate.
[See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103L (1957 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 175 (Mc-
Kinney 1982); VA. CODE. § 57-59 (1980 & Supp. 1985).]
1986]
